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ABSTRACT 
In recent years China is increasingly considered as a successful example for a 
transition towards a market economy. The growth rate of the Chinese economy has 
averaged 9.5 percent in the past fifteen years. What are the secirts behind the Chinese 
story? This dissertation aims to answer this question by analyzing three important areas in 
the Chinese economic reform - trade liberalization, the central-local governmental fiscal 
relation, and foreign investment. 
The first essay describes the extensive reforms to China's external sector from 
1979 to 1994. It then estimates an econometric model to test the empirical effect of trade 
liberalization on exports employing unit root, cointegration, and recursive coefficient 
stability tests. The major result found in this paper is that after 1984. six years after China 
embarked its historical economic reform, the paper finds some evidence of structural 
break of liberalization of exports which is contrast to previous studies. 
In the second essay, I employ the Principal-Agent Model to discuss the impact of 
corruption in local tax administration on the tax revenue of the central government in 
China. When the central government does not have the information about the true income 
of firms and local governments have great discretion in manipulating the tax 
administration system, the tax revenue of the central government is subject to erosion due 
to collusion between firms and local governments. To solve the problem, the central 
government needs to design incentive-compatible tax revenue sharing schemes for local 
governments. 
The third essay provides empirical evidence of the determinants of foreign direct 
investment inflows into China. It first shows that including human capital in the 
neoclassical growth model does not resolve the question: "Why doesn't capital flow from 
rich to poor countries?" posed by Lucas (1990). Twenty nine provinces in China are 
tested with the result that predicted rates of return to physical capital in some poor 
provinces are more than 600 percent of those in Shanghai, the representative rich 
province. The paper finds that the size of the market and the growth of private economy 
are the main factors that determine the foreign capital investment in China. 
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The People's Republic of China, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the 
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe are all facing the historic challenge of transforming 
their economies from a highly centralized planned system into an efficient market system. The 
success or failure of these efforts will have far-reaching implications for both the world economy 
and the delicate balance of political and military power in the world. 
In recent years China is increasingly considered as a successful example for a transition 
towards a market economy. The growth rate of the Chinese economy has averaged 9.5 percent in 
the past fifteen years. What are the secrets behind the Chinese story? 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the Chinese economic reform in three separate 
areas - the central-local government fiscal relation, trade liberalization, and foreign investment 
policies. It consists of three essays. Each essay focuses on one of the areas above. The findings of 
this dissertation should provide lessons for transition countries in reforming a socialist economic 
system. Western countries would observe evidence of the successes or failures of the Chinese 
economic reforms. Foreign investors particularly should find the results beneficial in making 
decisions to invest in China or other transition countries. 
In a typical centrally planned economy the foreign trade and exchange regime is tightly 
controlled by the government. As a result, domestic producers are insulated from international 
competition and domestic relative prices can differ substantially from those prevailing in the 
world market. Although China's efforts to liberalize her foreign trade were initiated in 1979, the 
1 
Chinese government has been reluctant to allow the exchange rate to be determined in the 
market. The foreign trade companies are still under the government's control. China's domestic 
prices are still separated from those in the world market. How has the process of trade 
liberalization affected the behaviors of exporting companies? Employing the Unit Root. Co-
integration. and stability tests, the second essay of the dissertation constructs an econometric 
model to test the relationship between the trade weighted real exchange rate of the Chinese Yuan 
and exports and to discuss the process of trade liberalization in China. 
To maintain its ability of raising revenue is a serious challenge for every government in a 
transition economy. After the enterprise reform introduced the competition and market 
mechanisms to the economy, the government is no longer able to appropriate profits of the state-
owned, often monopolistic, industries, but rather has to rely on an efficient tax administration for 
provision of national public goods. Analyzing China's fiscal reforms that began in 1980, it 
appears that the conflicts of interest between the central and local governments are a serious 
impediment for the implementation of an efficient tax system. Although the central government 
sets all tax rates and bases, it has to rely on local governments for tax auditing and collection. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s the central government's tax revenue has declined relative to 
gross national product and has subsequently weakened the central government's ability to control 
the overall economy. What has caused this problem? How should the central government modify 
the tangled relationship between the central and local governments? The first essay of this 
dissertation employs a Principal (central government)-Agent (local government) model to 
examine the problem and suggest resolutions. 
t 
Since the beginning of the 1980s China has attracted half of the total foreign direct 
investment flowing to the developing countries. What are the factors that determine these foreign 
capital inflows into China? Recently, the new endogenous approach has stressed that human 
capital is an important variable in the production process. Specifically, Lucas argued that after 
adjusting for human capital in the standard neoclassic model, the predicted rates of returns to 
physical capital should be exactly equal between a rich country and a poor country. The third 
essay of my dissertation will, for the first time, use China's provinces as a controlled 
environment to examine the determinants of capital inflows. I first employ Lucas' (1990) 
methodology to compute the rates of return to capital to test whether human capital is an 
important explanatory variable in the case of China. Then I use an empirical econometric test to 
identify the main factors that are actually attracting foreign capital to provinces in China. The 
factors that are standing for testing include human capital, market size, the growth of the private 
sector, income, exports, wage level, infrastructure condition, and industrialization. 
3 
CHAPTER 2 
EXPORT PROMOTION, TRADE PLANNING, AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
2.1. Introduction 
Since the launching of the reform program in 1979, the promotion of external trade. 
especially of exports, has been central to China's efforts to modernize its economy. Like many 
liberalizing economies China has embraced export promotion both because of the dynamic 
efficiency effects and to release perennial balance of payments constraints. This has involved a 
gradual diffusion of control from a centralized planning authority to the market and the 
maintenance of a competitive real effective exchange rate'. Whereas in 1978. all trade was 
monopolized by only 12 foreign trade corporations and their branches, today over 3600 foreign 
trade corporations' compete increasingly fiercely for export business. Since 1985. the real 
effective official exchange rate of the Chinese yuan has depreciated more than 100 percent. 
Recently, China announced that the yuan, the Chinese currency, would be fully convertible by 
1997. 
The export promotion policies have met with remarkable success. Exports have increased 
ninefold from 1979 to 1994 reaching $121 billion (Figure 2.1), outperforming those of most 
1
 Foreign investment (especially from Hong Kong) and duty-free access to imported inputs for 
export assembly are also the important factors that contributed to the growth of exports. From no 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1978, the total has risen to over 90,000 approved projects with 
a contracted value of $58.1 billion in 1994. Currently almost two thirds of China's manufacturing 
exports are based on processing activity that utilizes duty-free imports. 
2
 The World Bank (1994, P. 28). 
4 
other countries, including such new industrialized economies (NIEs) as Malaysia. China is now 
the eleventh largest exporting nation in the world. 
China is the largest developing economy to embark on a strategy of trade liberalization, 
and like other transition economies in Eastern Europe it is still in a period of transition from a 
planned to a market economy. This poses important challenges for the country's foreign trade 
policy. To date, little empirical work has been undertaken to determine the degree to which these 
reforms have caused Chinese exports to behave in conventional fashion and, particularly, the 
responsiveness of exports to movements in the exchange rate. The issue is important, both as a 
measure of the progress of liberalization and to understand the impact of standard policy tools. 
such as devaluation, on economic performance in a transition economy. More importantly, we 
can draw some lessons from China's experiences for other transition economies. Several studies 
have been undertaken by Chi Xie (1988) and Kaijun Lin (1988). who applied the elasticities and 
absorption approach to the Chinese external economy, by Jianping Huang (1988) who analyzed 
the issue of China's export multiplier, and by Nianci Xie and Ni Wei (1988) who argued the 
benefits of trade for China. The most provocative results to date were offered by an IMF scholar. 
Adi Brender (1992). He used quarterly unit value and volume series to estimate the income and 
price elasticities for China's exports and imports in the 1980s, and found that "the estimated 
export supply price elasticities are negative and became even more negative after the reforms in 
1985" 
This paper seeks to reexamine the reform period in China using fresh data, recently 
developed time series econometric techniques such as unit root, cointegration. and recursive 
coefficient stability tests, and standard tests for structural break to evaluate whether indeed, the 
5 
response to devaluation is perverse and whether the relation has changed over the period of 
reform. It constructs a trade weighted real exchange rate from the export weights of China's five 
major trade partners and the bilateral real exchange rates. The techniques employed in this paper 
can also be adopted for conducting similar studies in other transition economies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of China's reform of 
the foreign trade and exchange system after 1979. Section III models the exporting behavior of 
the FTCs. Section IV discusses the methodology and the data. Section V presents the regression 
results. Section VI concludes with implications for other transition economies. The data appendix 
is provided at the end. 
2.2 The Reforms of China's Foreign Trade and Exchange System 
Before 1979, China's foreign trade was a state monopoly controlled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFER1) and conducted through fourteen state-owned 
foreign trade corporations (FTCs). All the activities of foreign trade were carried out in 
accordance with the state planning. The objective of foreign trade planning was to generate 
sufficient foreign exchange through exports to finance imports of key raw materials and 
commodities. The MOFERT was responsible for drafting the annual foreign trade plan and the 
FTCs were responsible for implementing it. The foreign trade plans specified the types and 
quantities of commodities to be exported and imported and budgeted related foreign exchange 
receipts and outlays. They were "highly detailed, down to the level of individual commodities, by 
6 
locality, and by individual enterprises'. The export plan alone specified the quantities of some 
individual 3,000 commodities"4. 
Like many other developing countries, China was actively pursuing the import substation 
strategy. Thus " a high degree of protectionism and an overvalued exchange rate resulted in an 
inwardly oriented development strategy in which trade and other incentives were biased in favor 
of production for the domestic market and against production for export".3 
In order to shield from the fluctuations of the world market prices and carry out its 
foreign trade plan, the state insulated domestic prices from world market prices6. Domestic prices 
were set arbitrarily in accordance with the national development plan but reflecting the demand 
and supply conditions of the products. For example, the prices of coal, crude oil and heavy fuel 
oil were far below the world level. But refined petroleum products, such as gasoline, were priced 
much close to world levels7. To protect exports the exporting FTCs procured goods from 
domestic enterprises at the same price sold to domestic buyers. 
The official exchange rate of the Chinese currency was fixed at 2.46 yuan per U.S. dollar 
in 1955 and remained virtually unchanged for almost two decades. The yuan was highly 
overvalued, i.e.. the domestic currency price of foreign exchange was far too low. The 
3
 Cheng, 92, P.5. 
4
 Lardy. 92, P. 40. 
5
 Lardy, 92, P. 7. 
6
 Domestic prices merely changed before 1979 in China and thus were out of line with the world 
prices. 
7
 Lardy, 92, P. 91. Also refer to Lardy, 92, P. 92, table 4.2. a comparison of domestic and world 
prices for a broader range of products. 
7 
overvaluation of the exchange rate caused seventy percent of China's exports, particularly 
manufactured goods, sold at a financial loss8 prior to 1980. That meant that when the dollar 
earnings from the sale of exports were converted into yuan at the official rate they were less than 
the domestic price, the FTCs originally paid the producer for the goods9. The greater the exports, 
the greater the domestic currency losses. Within an individual company, the FTC usually used 
profits from imports to subsidize exports. Even though it incurred a net loss, the FTC did not 
have to be responsible for it. The MOFERT redistributed profits and losses among the FTCs 
nationwide. 
The overvaluation of the domestic currency and the system of cross subsidies had major 
implication for China's exchange regime and the FTC's exporting behavior. First. China had to 
establish a stringent system of foreign exchange control. The limited supply of foreign exchange 
was allocated bureaucratically by the Bank of China to priority users established by the sate 
through the economic planning process. Second, the change in the official exchange rate had 
little effect on the trade balance. The exchange rate of the yuan, was basically an accounting price 
between the Bank of China and the FTCs. It was used for the distribution of profits and losses 
among the FTCs and did not link domestic and world prices. As a consequence, the changes in 
the exchange rate would impact neither domestic production nor the trade balance. For example. 
a currency devaluation would increase the profitability of exports ;»nd reduce that of imports. 
However, since foreign trade profits and losses were all absorbed by the MOFERT. the fiscal 
Refer to Lardy, 92, P. 86, table 4.1: Financial profits and losses on exports by sector, 1983. and 
P. 25. table 2.1: Financial losses on China's exports. 
9
 Lardy, 92, P. 24-25. 
8 
impact of exchange rate changes was only a reshuffling of profits and losses among government 
bodies. Third, since the FTCs were not responsible for their losses and all of their exporting 
profits were submitted to the MOFERT10, they were indifferent between exporting products to 
the international markets or selling them to the domestic market. 
To promote the growth of exports, the Chinese government implemented a series of 
policies reforming its foreign trade and exchange system throughout the decade of the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s. The decentralization of foreign trade control and conduct, the 
reduction of trade planning and export subsidies (along with domestic price reform), the 
devaluation of the official exchange rate, and the development of a secondary foreign exchange 
market, and the establishment of a foreign exchange retention system all helped to increase the 
role of the exchange rate in China's exports. The replacement of fourteen national trade 
monopolies by a rapidly growing number of diversified FTCs introduced immediate competition 
into the exporting system; the shrinking of planned exports in total exports implies a growing 
share of the above-plan exports which are affected and guided by the prices in both domestic and 
international markets; the abolishing of export subsidies forces the FTCs to take the 
responsibility for their losses and therefore become more sensitive to the changes in the world 
prices; and finally, the access to a more depreciated swap market rate has helped exporters 
preserve the profitability of exporting and consequently link their exporting behavior more than 
ever with the changes in the exchange rate. 
In 1933. the aggregate financial losses on exports were 14 I billion yuan, accounting for 3 
percent of China's national income. Export losses were equal to one third of the value of exports 
measured in domestic currency. 
9 
Decentralization of the Control and Conduct of Foreign Trade 
The first step in China's 1979 foreign trade reform was to decentralize the control and 
conduct of foreign trade. Provincial and special municipality governments and large enterprises 
were allowed to establish their own trading enterprises. The authority over the foreign trade 
activities of the local branches of the nation FTCs were passed on to the provincial 
governments". The number of FTCs expanded rapidly. By 1984, there were already more than 
1,000 FTCs. compared with 14 in 1978. Currently there are over 5,000 FTCs in operation in 
China and every provincial and municipal government has its own network of FTCs. 
The FTCs and production enterprises were encouraged to seek cooperative arrangements 
to facilitate integration of marketing and production. For example, an agency system was 
established in foreign trade, whereby the FTCs exported or imported on behalf of domestic 
production enterprises on a fee basis. The agency system was better implemented in the imports 
side than the export side since the FTCs usually found it more profitable exporting for 
themselves rather than for their domestic production clients. 
To secure the exports of certain products, the state set up the "export production bases" 
where promising producing enterprise were provided with "various special privileges in terms of 
access of raw materials, energy, transport, imports of equipment and components, etc. or 
promotion of production of goods earmarked for exports"12. The FTCs that were responsible for 
exporting the products produced by the "export production bases" were subsequently enjoying 
"Cheng. 92, P. 11. 
12
 Cheng, 92. P.I I. 
10 
lower cost products. They had a higher incentive to export than those FTCs who were unable to 
achieve an access to these products. 
All these changes above illuminated the fact that the decentralizing of foreign trade 
control and conduct has created an incentive for the FTCs to export. Moreover, the competition 
among the FTCs would help to reduce the differentials between the domestic price and the world 
price and increase the responsiveness of exports to the changes in the world price. 
Reduction of trade planning 
Along with the decentralization of foreign trade authority, China reduced the scope of the 
national trade plan in January 1982, September 1984. February 1988. and January 1991. The 
number of commodities under the export plan fell from 3,000 commodities before 1979 to only 
199 in 1982. and 112 in 1988. By 1991, There were about 15 commodities (e.g. petroleum and 
petroleum products, gains, certain mining products, and medical herb) under the command 
exports plan. 
To reduce the share of strict national planning in foreign trade, the state divided the 
foreign trade plan into the command plan and the guidance plan in 1984. The command plan was 
mandatory, fixed in quantitative terms, and applied to specific products. In contrast, the guidance 
plan contained value targets assigned to provincial authorities, which were accorded considerable 
flexibility in determining how to achieve them. All procurements price of the mandatory exports 
were fixed, while that of guidance exports could be fixed, floating or free market, decided by the 
provincial governments. In 1986 about 60 percent of exports were subject to the mandatory 
II 
exports plan and 20 percent to the guidance plan . By 1988, the planned share of exports fell to 
45 percent of the total trade14. 
By 1988, about half of all commodity prices were determined in the market, another one 
forth floated within a range specified by the state. The state fixed the prices of only about one 
forth of all commodities. Moreover, the exports of foreign-invested firms and township and 
village enterprises accounted for almost half of the growth of exports over the decade of the 
1980s. 
The reduction of foreign trade plan implies an increase of the market share in the total 
foreign trade. Thus we should expect a lesser impact of planning on domestic price and FTCs' 
exports and a greater effect of market forces instead. However, since the guidance export targets 
were viewed by all as mandatory and many administrative measures were taken, not steps in the 
direction of promoting the market mechanism, the impact of planning on FTCs exporting 
behavior was not negligible. 
Reduction of Export Subsidies 
The effectiveness of the exchange rate in influencing the trade balance is dependent on its 
ability to affect the domestic price of export and import products. 
Until the late 1980s, all the losses on exports were borne by the state. The FTCs were not 
sensitive to the changes in the exchange rate. Moreover, since the FTCs were able to receive 
subsidies from the state to cover losses sustained on certain exports, many FTCs were relatively 
11
 The World Bank, 94, P. 28. 
14
 Lardy, 92, P. 40. 
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insensitive to the relation between the export price and the price at which they purchased those 
products from domestic producers. 
After 1984 there were still pervasive domestic price distortions and the FTCs were bound 
by obligations of the mandatory export and import plans, therefore the FTCs incurred losses 
when the export plan required them to purchase relatively high priced domestic goods, such as 
certain types of machinery and electronic products, and then to sell them on the international 
market. In 1986 direct fiscal subsidies to foreign trade companies to cover their losses were more 
than Y 24 billion, more than tow percent of China's gross national product and larger than the 
size of the official budget deficit. By 1988, total fiscal subsidies to FTCs had reached an annual 
level of over Y 26 billion. 
By 1988. the state clearly realized that the export promotion schemes favored the 
exporting FTCs and export-producing enterprises excessively because the latter shared with the 
government only in the profits but not the losses arising from exports. To solve the "moral 
hazard" problem involved in these schemes and reduce the government's subsidies on exports, 
the state implemented the foreign trade contract system in 1988, under which the MOFERT 
contracted with each province, autonomous region, and special municipality to achieve three 
targets: foreign exchange, exporting revenue, and amount of foreign exchange turned in to the 
state. Local governments were given incentives to fulfill and exceed the plan quotas, for 
example, they were allowed to retain a large share of the foreign exchange they earned that was 
above the basic contractual amount, but in the meantime they were required to be responsible for 
most of their exports losses. 
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In 1991, the government went further to abolish all the export subsidies. When the FTCs 
were made responsible for their profits and losses, the links between the international and the 
domestic prices of export products have become stronger. 
Devaluation of the Official Exchange Rate 
The decade of the 1980s was one of far-reaching reform for China's foreign trade system. 
The most important procedure undertaken was that "China began to adopt a more realistic 
exchange rate policy and reformed the pricing of traded goods. The value of the domestic 
currency in trade transactions was cut almost in half near the outset of reform, and this was 
followed by further significant devaluation's in 1985, 1986, and 1990. Although progress was 
initially slow, by the end of the decade, a growing share of exporters was able to bargain to 
receive domestic currency prices that more closely approximated world prices"15. 
Before 1973. the Chinese currency, the yuan, was pegged to the US dollar. After March 
1983 it was pegged to a basket of currencies when major western countries abolished the fixed 
exchange rate regime and allowed their currencies to float. To reduce the domestic currency 
losses of foreign trade and provide greater incentives for exporters, the state effectively cut the 
value of the yuan by almost half by introducing an internal settlement rate of 2.8 yuan to the 
dollar in trade transaction beginning in January, 1991. Thus between 1981 and 1984 a dual 
exchange rate regime prevailed in China: the official rate and the secondary rate. The official 
rate depreciated gradually while the secondary rate was fixed at a more depreciated rate; the 
secondary rate, termed the internal settlement rate priced at SI =Y2.8 while the official rate at Si 
"Lardy,92,P.8l. 
14 
= Y 1.5 in 1981, was used for settlement of payments between FTCs and the supplying 
enterprises to ease the negative impact of the highly appreciated exchange rate on exporting 
industries. In January 1985, the official exchange rate was set at the internal settlement rate, and 
the latter was abolished. 
In 1986, the first Foreign Exchange Adjustment (or Swap) Center (FEACs) was 
established in Shanghai where the FTCs were allowed to trade in foreign exchange at rates freely 
negotiated by eligible participants. Two years later the FEACs were opened in all provinces and 
the swap rate was allowed to float. The FTCs were allowed to buy and sell foreign exchange as 
well as retention quotas which can be used to acquire foreign exchange at the official rate to 
finance primarily .. ade transactions not included in the plan. Reflecting the real market demand 
for foreign exchange, the swap rate was considerably higher than the highly appreciated official 
exchange rate. In the first quarter of 1988, for example, the swap rate was 63 percent above the 
official rate (Table 2). Since 1986, the yuan was devaluated several times: July 1986, December 
1989, and November 1990 to minimize the difference between the swap rate and the official rate. 
On April 9. 1991. a new system of a managed float was adopted for the official rate. The 
government adjusted the administered official rate frequently based upon several factors 
including developments in balance of payments, developments in foreign currency markets. 
developments in FEACs, and the changes in the domestic resource cost of earning foreign 
exchange. On January I, 1994, the official exchange rate and the swap rate of the yuan became 
one single rate (Figure 2.2). China realized the uniformity of the exchange rate. The exchange 
rate is currently under a new managed floating system: it is decided by the market but managed 
by the government. 
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Foreign Exchange Retention Scheme and Secondary Foreign Exchange Market 
Like most developing countries, China had a chronic foreign exchange shortage. To 
encourage foreign trade activities, a foreign exchange retention system was established to allow 
the various entities directly responsible for exporting to share the export proceeds varying from 
20 percent to 40 percent. The retained shares were then in general split evenly between the FTC 
handling an export transaction and the firm producing the goods. Industries and enterprises that 
created high export proceeds were given larger shares of foreign exchange. 
In October 1980, the foreign exchange adjustment service was provided in twelve cities 
in China. Companies with excess retained foreign exchange were allowed to sell it to other firms 
who sought access to foreign exchange to purchase imports outside the plan. Furthermore. 
starting in August 1981. the foreign exchange retention quotas were allowed to be transferable 
among enterprises. Initially the volume of transactions in these local secondary foreign exchange 
markets was limited, perhaps in part because the state sought to constrain the price at which these 
swaps occurred to the official exchange rate, which highly overvalued the domestic currency. 
In October 1986, foreign companies were allowed to join the foreign exchange 
adjustment centers, which significantly expanded China's foreign exchange market. In February 
1991, a uniform exchange retention ratio was applied to all regions of the country except the 
special economic zones, which continued to retain higher ratios. The retention rate for general 
commodities was 80 percent, including 10 percent for the local government, 10 percent for the 
producing enterprise, and 60 percent for the FTC. 
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The 1988 reform linked expanded foreign exchange retention rights with a liberalized 
foreign exchange market. First, quota controls on the utilization of retained foreign exchange 
were abolished. Second, each province, autonomous region and centrally administered city was 
authorized to establish at least one foreign exchange swap center (FEAC) within its territory. By 
the end of December 1992, there were over 100 FEACs in operation. Third, a national foreign 
currency swap center was also to be established in Beijing to facilitate currency transactions 
between central government agencies and local swap markets in different administrative 
jurisdictions. Finally, the swap markets were opened formally not only to foreign-invested 
enterprises but to state-owned and collectively owned enterprises as well. These reforms led to 
significant increases in the volume of foreign currency transactions on secondary markets. 
According to the World Bank (1994), after 1986 the effective exchange rate for exporters 
in China is a weighted average of the official and swap market rates, the weights being 
determined by the size of the foreign exchange retention ratio. Overvaluation of the official 
exchange rate is equivalent to imposing a tax on exporters in the amount of the difference 
between the swap market rate and the effective exchange rate received by exporters. Indeed, 
exports have followed more closely the trend in the weighted average rate than in the official rate 
since 1987 (Figure 2.3). Also. Figures 4-8 and 4'-8' show that the responsiveness of China's 
exports (to its five major trade partners) to the bilateral real exchange rates computed from the 
official rates is weaker than to those computed from the weighted official and swap exchange 
rates after 1987. Thus, access to a more depreciated swap market rate has helped exporters 
preserve the profitability of exporting. 
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Foreign exchange retention program and the development of secondary market provided 
the FTCs needed foreign exchange to import and sell export profits. Their exporting behavior is 
more sensitive to changes in the exchange rate. 
In summary, all these changes have created substantial incentives for foreign trade 
companies to engage in foreign trade and expand exports. Moreover, not only should we expect 
greater exports; we also should document structural break in the real exchange rate regime after 
the economic reform16. Cheng (1992) argued, "although prior to 1979. the exchange rate was 
merely in internal accounting price for domestic settlement purposes, reform had proceeded far 
enough by tiie second half of the 1980s to make the exchange rate a significant link between 
domestic and foreign prices." 
2J . Modeling the FTCs' Exporting Behavior 
As discussed above, before 1984 China's export plan was carried out in terms of 
quantities and applied to specific products. From 1984 to 1988 China's export plan was 
comprised of two components: the command plan and the guidance plan. The command plan was 
fixed in quantitative terms and the guidance plan was specified by value targets. In 1986. sixty 
percent of China's total exports were subject to the mandatory export plan and twenty percent to 
;
* Lardy. 92, P. 83. He commented, "In principle, the foreign trade reforms in place by the end of 
the 1980s should have led to a significant improvement in the efficiency of China's foreign trade. 
Reforms of the pricing of traded goods have almost certainly greatly reduced the wide and 
variable gaps separating domestic prices and those prevailing in international markets. Combined 
with the persistent move toward a more realistically valued official exchange rate and the 
substantially increased use of auction markets to allocate foreign exchange, a growing share of 
importers and exporters face prices that more clearly reflect real opportunity costs rather than 
arbitrary prices set decades ago." 
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the guidance plan. In the first quarter of 1992, there were still fifteen percent of exports that were 
under mandatory export plan. Therefore, we first model the exporting behavior of the FTCs 
under a quantity-target export plan and then a value-target export plan. Our objective is to find 
out the movements of the FTCs' exports when the exchange rate depreciates or the world price 
increases. 
Under a Quantity-Target Export Plan 
Suppose that there are i regions in China, where i = I, 2,..., 30. In each region, there arc 
j FTCs with j = 1. 2 m ( m denotes a limited integer). The FTC y's two-period profit-
maximizing function17 can be characterized by 
MAX {r,tEPml -[YtlPt +(/-„ -Yc;)Pm]}+{Yl2EPw2 -[Y(2Pr + (K;1 - Yc2 )Pn ]} (2.1) 
SI. %: =/(%,-%,) (2.2, 
Where Y/t and V/2 represent the total exports and YH and Yc2 the planned command exports in 
the first and second periods respectively; YlX - Yrl and Yl2 - Ycl thus indicate the total above-plan 
exports. Pw, P.. and Pm represent the world price of exports, the procurement price of command 
exports products, and the domestic market price of above-plan exports products, respectively. E 
is the exchange rate of the Chinese Yuan denoted by the U.S. dollar. 
17
 The FTCs could be characterized as a profit-maximizing function bodies since higher profits 
would imply higher welfare for the workers and better chances of promotion for the managers in 
the FTCs. However, because the government was subsidizing the command plan exports and 
cover the losses of the FTCs, the FTCs' labor and capital costs were integrated into the 
government budget. 
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The constraint equation (2.2) implies that FTC j s' performance on carrying out their 
planned exports assignment and above-plan exports in the current year would usually be used as 
a basis to determine their next year's planned exports assignment. Such a constraint is needed to 
capture "the ratchet effect" discussed by Brender (1992, P. 27). 
Assume that Pw, Pc, and Pm constant across the periods, then the first and second order 
conditions of FTC y's profit maximizing function with respect to V;I are 
fP„, -Pm - ( % - % , ) / ' ( r „ - % , ) = 0 (2.3) 
and -{Pc- Pm )f(Yll - % , ) < 0 (2.4) 
respectively. 
Equation (2.3) implies that the FTC ; s marginal revenue of exporting is EPW, and its 
marginal cost is Pm +(Pr - Pm)f'(YlX - % , ) . Thus, when FTC j decides whether to export an 
addition J unit of product to the world market, his decision variables include the domestic market 
price ( Pm), the procurement price ( Pc) of export products, and the rate of increase of the 
command exports target in the second period due to the increase of its total export in the first 
period ( / '(K,, - YcX)). Specifically, / '{YlX - YcX) captures the phenomenon of "whipping the fast 
caw" (explain more). Later in this paper we refer it as the "punishment rate for over-exporting" 
(i.e., when the realized K, is greater than its planned volume). 
Transforming equation (2.3) derives 
EP . -P 
P-Pm= "' " . (2.5) 
Equation (2.4) reveals the subtle relations among Pr, Pm and P.,. 
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First, if Pc < Pm (i.e., the government is subsidizing FTC j ) , then EPwX < P„. This 
implies that when the government subsidizes FTC j by providing it with exports products priced 
lower than at the domestic market, domestic demand for this product18 is usually depressed. 
Domestic consumers are paying a higher price and the government incurs heavy debts itself due 
to such subsidies. In this case, the world price is usually lower than its domestic market price. 
Second, if Pc > Pm (i.e., the government is taxing FTC j ) , then EPmX > Pm. This implies 
that when the government forces FTC j to buy command export products'9 priced higher than at 
the domestic market, the cost of exporting one additional unit of product to the world market is 
higher than selling it to the domestic market due to the tax (the difference between Pc and Pm) 
imposed by the government. Thus, its world price usually is higher than its domestic market one. 
Only when the procurement price of command export product is equal to its domestic 
market price ( P = Pm), can we expect its world market price equal to its domestic market price 
( Pm - P„) - an undistorted price mechanism in the domestic market. 
To observe how the volume of total exports of FTC j changes when the exchange rate 
depreciates or the world price goes up, we derive 
18
 For example, petroleum, coal. iron, pig, and steal. 
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 The export licensing system was established in 1980 to reduce the internal competition in 
some agricultural goods exporting to Hong Kong and Macao, to prevent domestic shortage of a 
number of goods - mostly primary products, such as petroleum, coal, pig, iron, and steal - of 
which the domestic prices were artificially suppressed to benefit domestic users, and to comply 
with quantitative restriction on its exports in foreign market (e.g., textiles and garments). In 
1986, there were 225 commodities on the export licensing list, whose total value accounted for 
about one-quarter of total exports. 
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J%L. = ! . (2.6) 
dEPwl (Pe-PJf(YlX-YeX) 
From the second condition equation (3) we know that when Pc < Pm, f"(Y/X - YcX) < 0 ; 
and when Pc>Pm, t"(%, - ^ ) > O . 
dY
,\ Therefore, equation (5) gives us the following results: when Pc < P„, — — > 0 if 
dEPwX 
dY, 
/ " (y„-r ; , )<0;andwhen Pc>Pm. —f->0 if f{Y)X -YcX)>0. 
atPwX 
Pr < Pm implies that FTC ; has the privilege of obtaining export products priced lower 
than at the domestic market. Moreover, the punishment rate of over-exporting decreases as it 
increases its total exports. Thus. FTC j has an incentive to export at a higher level when the 
dYlX 
world price increases or the exchange rate depreciates, which implies > 0. 
dKx 
When the government forces the FTCs to purchase their command exports products at 
prices higher than at the domestic market, the government is taxing the FTC for exporting. The 
FTC's export price is higher than when the government subsidizes it with Pc < Pm. In the 
meantime, if the government also increases the growth rate of its export quota when the world 
price goes up, then the FTCs have to export more when the exchange rate depreciates to meet the 
increased c However, since the export plan is specified by quantities, we still can see — — > 0 
even though the punishment rate is increasing. 
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Proposition I: When the FTC j is required to carry out a quantity-target export plan, its total 
exports increases when the exchange rate depreciates or the world price goes up regardless of the 
movement of the punishment rate of over-exporting and the imposition of taxes by the 
government. 
Under a Value-Target Export Plan 
Under a value-target export plan, FTC ;"s two-period profit-maximizing function is 
characterized by 
MAX [YIXEPWX -[YcXPc +(X„ - YcX)Pm]}+{Yl2EP„2 -[YclPc + 1% - Yr2)Pm}} (2.7) 
St. Yc2=f(YlXEPwX-YcXP.). (2.8) 
Thus, we have 
F.O.C. P . , - P . - ( f - P j / ' ( r „ P . - % , P j P , . , =0 . (2.9) 
and S.O.C. -<P,. -Pm)f'(YltPw - YcXPc)Pj <0 . (2.10) 
Transforming equation (2.9) gives us 
P ,-P Pc-pm=— =! = (2.11) f'(YlXPw-YcXPc)PwX 
Substituting (2.11) into (2.10), we have 
EP - P 
- - ' " / " ( % , - t , ) < 0 . (2.12) 
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or (EPvX-P/jyi<l)>0. (2.13) 
/ ( \ , - * r | ) 
Therefore, when EPwX<PM, f"(YlX-YcX)<f\YlX-YcX); and when EPwX>Pm, 




dP« ~ (P<~Pm)fWlXPwX-YcXPc)PwXl 
^y-[/"(K„p.,-y;,pjp.,+/'(y„p_,-r;,pj] 
dYx In the case of subsidizing (i.e. Pc < Pm), —— > 0 if 
r ( r„P . , -y%P)<0 (2.16, 
and \f"(Y)XP„x-YcXPc)PwX\<f'(YlXPvX-YcXP(). (2.17) 





and f"(Y.xP^-YcXPc)>0. (2.20) 
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Proposition 2: When the FTC j is required to carry out a value-target export plan, (I) in the case 
of subsidizing, its total exports increases as the exchange rate depreciates or the world price goes 
up only if the punishing rate of over-exporting is declining; (2) in the case of taxing, its total 
exports increases as the exchange rate depreciates or the world price goes up only if the 
punishing rate of over-exporting is increasing and the growth rate of the punishment rate of over-
exporting is less than one. 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
From Section 2.3, the model of China's FTC's behavior under an export plan, we know 
that the FTCs increase their exports when the exchange rate depreciates or the world price 
increases no matter the export plan is a quantity-target or value-target. 
Brender (1992) estimated the income and price elasticities of China's exports and imports 
in the 1980s by employing quarterly unit value and volume series. He found that the supply price 
of exports elasticity was negative. This he identifies as a result of the dominant effect of 
administrative controls on China's trade. However, his argument overstates the case. From 1984 
to 1991 the FTCs were required to achieve the quantity target of command-planned exports and 
the value target of guidance-planned exports20. The changes in the world prices of exports only 
affect the value target of guidance-planned exports. The quantity target of command-planned 
exports needs to be carried out regardless of any change in world prices. In 1986 seventy five 
percent of plan exports were command-planned (quantity target) and twenty five percent were 
guidance-planned (value target) in China. Although the 1988 reform reduced the number of 
20
 World Bank, 1988, Page 106. 
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mandatory planning exports, they still accounted for 47.5 percent of the total exports. The 1991 
reform officially abolished all mandatory exports planning. However, the state still retains some 
control through the continued use of licensing. Therefore we should NOT observe a strong 
response by China's exports to the unit value change, as Brender (1992) argued.21 
In this section we test the effect of the real exchange rate on China's exports and how the 
relation changes over time. 
Distinct from previous studies, we construct a trade weighted real exchange rate 
(TWRER) and the trade weighted real foreign incomes (FGDP) from the nominal exchange rates 
and the GNP (or GDP) of the five major trade partners of China. Also, we include an interactive 
dummy variable (D) on the real exchange rate at the time of reform to test for market based 
export responsiveness to the real exchange rate. 
The model we test is 
EXPORTS, =a„ + a , TWRER, + a , FGDP+,a, £>+a4 DTWRER, + a , D FGDP, +u, 
(2.21, 
where EXPORTS = China's total exports, 
21
 The implication of this argument can be clarified in the following example. 
Guidance-planned exports. Suppose that the target of export value is $100 and the unit 
value of exports is $1, then 100 units of goods have to be exported. When the price of exports 
goes up, say, by 100 percent, the unit value rises to $2. and only 50 units of goods need to be 
exported to meet the $100 target. In this case negative supply price elasticities of exports may 
prevail, which conforms to the argument in Brender( 1992). 
Command-planned exports. Suppose that the target of export quantity is 100 units and the 
unit value of exports remains S1. Changes in world prices do not change the amount of the FTCs 
quantity target. The same amount of exports, 100 units, have to be achieved to meet the target. 
Thus the command planning exports do not link the changes in the world price of exports with 
the total quantity of exports. 
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TWRER= China's trade weighted real exchange rate, 
FGDP = trade weighted foreign income, 
D = dummy variable marking economic reforms, 
We estimate the model at both yearly (1970 to 1994) and quarterly (1982:2 to 1995:2) 
frequency. First, we employ the aggregated yearly data for the five principal trade partners of 
China to test the relation between China's exports and the TWRER. Second, we adopt data from 
these five individual countries to demonstrate which country has the closest relation with China's 
external sector. For simplicity, these two sets of data are called Total-Y and INDIV.-Y 
respectively. Finally, we test how China's quarterly exports have been responding to the quarterly 
real exchange rates of the yuan. Similarly, two sets of data for Total-Q and INDIV.-Q are 
generated, where Q represents quarterly data. A seasonality variable (5) is introduced here to 
account for the seasonal trend of exports. All the data are denoted by the U.S. dollar and deflated 
by the United States WPI (1990=100) price. Detailed data explanations are provided in the 
appendix. 
Defining the Trade Weighted Real Exchange Rate 
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the prices of tradable goods to 
nontradables goods. This study uses the following proxies for the real exchange rate of the 
Chinese yuan: 
• - e s s ! . <2.22, 
CPI 
27 
where E is the bilateral nominal exchange rate for each of China's five major trading partners, 
WPT is the foreign country's wholesale price index and CPUs China's consumer price index. 
This measure is appropriate because the WPT includes mostly tradable goods, while the CPI 
includes a high proportion of nontradable goods and services. Since the definitions of the 
exchange rates of the Chinese yuan have changed over time, the nominal exchange rates we 
employed in this paper are not exclusively official rates but the following combinations: 
January 1, 1970 - Dec. 31,1980: official exchange rate; 
January 1.1981 - Dec. 31.1984: official exchange rate; 
January I. 1985 - Dec. 31. 1986: official rate-
January I, 1987 - Dec. 31,1993: a weighted rate of swap rate and official rate. The 
weight was the foreign exchange retention rate. According to Lardy (1992. p. 54) in the 
IMF such a weight was 0.44 from January I. 1987 to December 31. 1990, and 0.8 from 
January I. 1991 till December31. 1993 (Table 2.1); 
January I. 1994 - present: the official rate (i.e. the swap rate). 
In order to account for multiple trading partners, a trade-weighted real exchange rate is 
calculated for China in the sample using the formula 
7 
K£/? = £ln(r«rr)W;. (2.23) 
The term rer: is the bilateral real exchange rate for each of China's five major trading 
partners, and Wf is the corresponding trade weight for each of the trading partners (Table 2.2). 
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Preliminary Data Analysis: Unit Root, Cointegration, and Stability Tests 
Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) defined a non-stationary time series X, to 
be integrated of order d if it achieves stationarity after being differenced d times. Statistics such 
as the t and DW statistics, and measures such as R2 did not retain their traditional characteristics 
in the presence of nonstationary data: running regressions with such data produced spurious 
results. The unit root test is used by econometricians to test whether a data series is stationary or 
not. Let y, = y,_, + e,, where E is a stationary error term, i.e., E is 1(0). Here y can be seen to 
be /(I) because Ay, =E, . which is 1(0). Now let this relationship be expressed in a slightly 
more general form as y, = ay,_, + e,. If |a| < I, then y is /(0), i.e., stationary, but if a = I then 
y is 1(1), i.e.. nonstationary. Thus formal tests of stationarity are test for a = I. and because of 
this are referred to as tests for a unit root. 
According to Engle and Granger (1987) it will generally be true that a linear combination 
z, = X, -aY, will also be 1(d). However, if there exist a constant like b, such that 
z, - I((d -6)where b > 0. then X, and Y, are said to be cointegrated implying that there exists 
a long-run equilibrium relation between the two. Therefore, testing for cointegration is usually 
reduced to taking three simple steps. First, we test and make sure that each series is integrated of 
the same order, i.e.. X, - 1(d) and Y, - 1(d). Second, we estimate the following cointegration 
regression by ordinary least square equations. 
X, =a + pr;+e,. (2.24) 
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Third, we test for the stationarity of the residuals from equations (I) and (2) to make sure 
thate, - l(d-b), where 6 > 0 . For example, if X, - /(l) and Y, - 1(1), in order for X, and Y, 
to be cointegrated, £, should be 1(0) . 
Unit roots are present in most of the first difference data series tested (Table 2.3). In the 
absence of evidence of a cointegrating vector, the error correction specification was forgone in 
favor of a specification in first difference. Recursive coefficient stability tests are run to capture 
the stability feature and possible structural break points on both yearly and quarterly data (Figure 
2.4a and Figure 2.4b . The volatility of quarterly data prohibits further examination of structural 
breaks while most yearly data yielded insignificant structural break points. 
25. The Graphs and Regression Results 
The Graphs 
Figures 2.5 - 2.29 present graphical evidence on the relation between China's exports and 
the trade weighted real exchange rate, foreign income and China's gross domestic product during 
the reform period. 
First, Figures 2.5 - 2.7 (Total-Y) show that China's exports have been moving together 
with the TWRER, FGDP, and China's GDP except for several years22. For example, the real 
exchange rate of the Chinese yuan was depreciating in 1992, but China's exports started to 
decrease. Various reasons may have contributed to the irregular movement during those years: 
-They are 1979-80, 1984-85, 1986-88, and 1988-92 for the TWRER. the 1976-77. 1981-82, 
1983-87. 1990-91, and 1992-94 for FGDP, and 1982-86, 1990-94 for China's GDP. 
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China's highly controlled foreign exchange and trade regime, frequent deprecations of the 
exchange rate, the depression of industrialized economies, and the trade barrier from the Unite 
States. 
Second, Figures 2.8 - 2.12 illustrate how the Chinese exports to the United States, Japan. 
Hong Kong, Germany, and the United Kingdom respond to the movements of the bilateral real 
exchange rates from 1971 to 1994. 
The United States: The Chinese exports to the United States has been following the 
movements of the real exchange rate of the Chinese Yuan against the U.S. dollar since 1975. 
especially, from 1983 to 1987. This should not be surprising sine the U.S. dollar is the driving 
foreign currency that decides the value of the Chinese yuan. On the other hand, the close and 
normal relationship between China's exports and the real exchange rate with the U.S. dollar is 
surprisingly conveying a message that China's economic reform has been successful, to some 
extent, in its foreign trade area because when the Chinese yuan depreciates relative to the U S. 
dollar. China's exports to the United States tend to go up. 
Japan: China's exports to Japan have moved along with the changes in the real exchange 
rate of the Chinese yuan against the Japanese yen since 1979 except from 1984 to 1987. Large 
inflows of the Japanese goods into the Chinese market in the beginning of 1980s and several 
incidents of inferior Japanese products caused the nation's attention. University students warned 
the Chinese government and people that the overwhelming booming of the Japanese products 
may indicate the start of an "economic war" or "occupation" by Japan. Many regions and 
companies were boycotting the Japanese products or refused to do business with Japan. These 
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movements may be one of the reasons that explain the unusual relationship between China's 
exports to Japan and the real exchange rate of the Chinese yuan against the Japanese yen. 
Germany: China's exports to Germany have been responding to the changes in the real 
exchange rate of the Chinese yuan against the German mark for the whole period except from 
1982 to 1985 and after 199123. During 1981-84. a dual exchange rate prevailed in China: the 
official rate and the secondary rate. The official rate depreciated gradually while the secondary 
rate was fixed at a more depreciated rate. The official rate was used for export transactions while 
the secondary rate was used for settlement of payments between FTCs and the supplying 
enterprises to ease the negative impact of the highly appreciated exchange rate on exporting 
industries. The official exchange rate did not reflect the true cost of exports. Therefore, we might 
not see a positive export elasticity. 
The United Kingdom: There does not seem to be an obvious correlation between China's 
exports to the United Kingdom and the bilateral real exchange rate except from 1980 to 1981 
and from 1988 to 1990. Between 1985 and 1989 the average share of China's exports to the 
United Kingdom was below two percent of China's total exports. Also, China's exports to the 
United Kingdom has been more volatile, relatively to the other four countries. Therefore. »n 
examining the impact of the real exchange rate on China's exports to the United Kingdom, some 
random effects may prevail. 
Hong Kong: China's exports to Hong Kong have been following a normal path with the 
changes in the real exchange rate of the Chinese yuan against the Hong Kong dollar except from 
23
 The collapse of Berlin Wall in 1991 and the following increase in German interest rate may 
have contributed to a unusual relationship between the Chinese exports and the real exchange 
rate of the Chinese yuan again the German mark. 
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1982-1985 and after 1993. We know that the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
Thus naturally we might expect a similar movement between China's exports to Hong Kong and 
the bilateral real exchange rate as that between China's exports to the United States and the real 
exchange rate of the Chinese yuan against the US dollar. However, this is not necessarily 
prevailing because the special relationship between China and Hong Kong inherently makes 
China's exports to Hong Kong highly sensitive and vulnerable to the ups and downs in the 
political field, especially the issue of repatriation of Hong Kong to China in 1997. After 1993. the 
political relationship between China and Hong Kong deteriorated due to the sharp disagreement 
between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong government on several issues. 
Figures 2.13-2.17 show the relatively weaker responsiveness of China's exports to the 
official exchange rate after 1987, compared to the weighted official and swap exchange rate in 
Figures 2.8 - 2.12. This conforms to the argument made by the World Bank (1994). 
Third, the co-movements of China's exports to each of the five biggest trade partners and 
these countries' income are illustrated in Figures 2.18 - 2.22. Similarly China's exports have co-
moved with the changes in these countries' income closely except for several years. 
Finally, China's quarterly exports fluctuate with more volatility (Figures 2.23 - 2.29) than 
its yearly aggregates. Moreover, its strong seasonal behavior prevents graphical illustration of its 
relation with the real exchange rates. 
The graphs above show that the Brender's effect, i.e., negative export elasticities of the 
real exchange rate, has occurred for some of the years in the 1980s, although for most of years. 
positive export elasticities prevailed. 
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The Regression Results24 
The regression results (reported in the appendix) are not as illustrative as the Figures. 
However, they do show the same patterns of the movements of China's exports, the real 
exchange rate, and foreign income. Overall we see mixed signals of the impact of the trade 
weighted real exchange rate on China's exports. 
Yearly Data (Table 2.4) 
Model 1 
China's exports tend to increase (or decrease) when the TWRER depreciates (or 
appreciates). A one percent depreciation in the TWRER induces a 0.22 percent increase in 
China's exports. 
The change in the bilateral real exchange rate does not seem to affect China's exports 
significantly except in the case of Hong Kong where a negative export elasticity dominated. The 
exchange rate of the Chinese yuan is tied to the movement of the balance of payments with its 
multiple trade partners25, which might overcast the importance of a bilateral real exchange rate 
on China's exports to the relevant country. 
24
 China's GDP is excluded from the model since it did not turn to be significant. 
25
 China's trade with Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
accounts for sixty percent of its total trade. 
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Model 2 
A one percent increase in FGDP (TOTAL-Y) will increase China's exports by 0.28 
percent. In INDIV.-Y the exports elasticities of foreign income range from 0.2903 to 1.3209. 
Model 3 
When the TWRER and FGDP are both regressed as independent variables, the TWRER 
turned out insignificant while the significance of the FGDP became stronger than in Model 2. 
Model 4 
The inclusion of the structural variables of the TWRER revealed negative export 
elasticity when we use 1984 (-0.07 percent) and 1987 (-0.37 percent) as dummy variables26, so 
did the real exchange rate of the Chinese yuan with the Japanese yen. German Mark, and Hong 
Kong dollar27. As the graphs revealed, there does not seem to be a clear cut - a point or a year 
after which the economic reform built an instructive relation between China's exports and the 
real exchange rate. So the inclusion of the dummy variables did not seem to be significant. 
Instead, the reform in the area of foreign trade and exchange has affected the exports differently 
during the 1980s: positive in some years and negative in some other years. 
26
 The 1979 dummy did not turn to be significant. 
2
' There are only twenty four observations in yearly data set. 
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ModelS 
When we include the structural variables of FGDP into the regressions and derive 
negative exports elasticities for FGDP: -0.02 percent for D79, -0.27 for D84, and -0.28 for 
D87.The explanation in Model 4 may apply here also. 
Model 6 
In this model, we regress China's exports on the real exchange rate, foreign income, and 
their structural variables. Again, we do not observe a uniform pattern here. Both positive and 
negative elasticities have appeared. One of the reasons that might explain why export 
elasticities are negative is that a large share of export earnings are generated by foreign invested 
firms with a high import content, with imports coming in duty free as long as they are inputs into 
export production. These exports are generally insensitive to currency fluctuations because the 
within-China value-added component is pretty small28. From essentially nothing in 1984. by 
1993.47% of exports are produced with the use of imports coming in duty free. 
Quarterly Data (Table 2.5) 
Comparing with the yearly data, regressions with the quarterly data yield more significant 
result29. Moreover, the seasonality variables are significant in all the regression equations. The 
special "Surge in December, plunge in January"30 in China's exports is captured both by 
28
 Naughton, Barry (1996, Misc.) 
29
 There are more observations in quarterly data set. 
w
 Shan (1989), P33-55. 
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regressions and by graphs since in the quarterly regression results, the constant terms — the 
seasonal explanations of the first quarter - all negative. 
Model 1 
When quarterly exports are regressed on the quarterly real exchange rate, the export 
elasticities are all positive, especially those of the USR (0.55) and JR (0.6) are significantly 
positive. 
Model 2 
All equations are significant with the export elasticities of FGDP ranging from 0.38 
(FGDPQ) to 0.86 (JPQ). 
Model 3 
When the real exchange rates and FGDPQ are both included as independent variables as 
in the quarterly data. The real exchange rate is not significant and produce negative export 
elasticities. 
Model 4-6 
Similarly as in the Yearly Data, we see the mixed results here: both negative and positive 
export elasticities. 
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Selected Models (Table 2.6) 
When we include the lagged independent variables in the regressions, we also see a 
mixed pattern of export elasticities of the real exchange rates: some of them are negative and 
some of them positive. 
2.6. Conclusions 
China has made significant progress in moving to a more market-based export sector. 
The reduction of planned exports and exports subsidies, the establishment of a foreign exchange 
retention system and adjustment centers have all contributed to a greater responsiveness of 
exports to the changes in the real exchange rate in China. 
To contrast with previous studies, the paper finds some evidence of a structural break of 
liberalization of exports after 1984, five years after China embarked on its historic economic 
reform. The overall results do not provide strong evidence of a negative price elasticity of exports 
with respect to the real exchange rate as argued by Brender (1992). 
Although China and Eastern Europe have initiated different political revolutions, they 
seem to share some common economic problems, for example, the pricing of traded goods in 
socialist states poses an obstacle to increased openness that is at least an order of magnitude 
greater than that faced by most developing economies. The Chinese experience demonstrated the 
importance of sustained decentralization of control of foreign trade'' and the maintenance of a 
competitive real exchange rate. 
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China Total Exports (EXPORTSY) In millions of US$. Deflated by the United States' WPI 
(1990=100); China Statistical Yearbook, International Finance Statistics. 
Trade Weighted Real Exchange Rate (TWRERY) Weighted sum of the real bilateral exchange 
rates to the Chinese yuan of five major trade partners of China (Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States). Each country's weight is equal to its trade share in the 
Chinese exports; International Finance Statistics, Indicators of Developing Countries by Asian 
Development Bank. 
China Gross Domestic Product (CHINA) In millions of US$. Deflated the United States' WPI 
(1990=100); International Finance Statistics. 
China's Exports to United States (USX), Japan (JX), Germany (GX), United Kingdom (UKX), 
and Hong Kong (HX) In millions ofUSS. Deflated the United States' WPI (1990=100); 
Direction of Trade. 
The Real Exchange Rates of Chinese Yuan with the US Dollar (USR), Japanese yuan (JR), 
German Mark (GR), UK Pound (UKR), and HK dollar (HR) Deflated by the ratio of these 
five countries' WPI data (1990=100) and China's CPI data (1990=100). International Finance 
Statistics, Indicators of Developing Countries by Asia Development Bank. 
GDP of United States (USP), Untied Kingdom (UKP), and Hong Kong (HP), and GNP of 
Japan (JP) and Germany (GP) In millions of US$. Deflated the United States' WPI 
(1990=100); International Finance Statistics. 
Quarterly Data 
China's Total Exports (EXPORTSQ) Deflated by China's CPI data (1990=100); Bank Credit 
Analysis Group. 
China exports to the Untied States (USXQ), Japan (JXQ), Germany (GXQ), Untied Kingdom 
(UKXQ), and Hong Kong (HXQ). ) Deflated by China's CPI data (1990=100); Bank Credit 
Analysis Group. 
GDP of Untied States (USPQ), United Kingdom (UKPQ), and GNP of Japan (JPQ) and 
Germany (GPQ): In millions of US$. Deflated by the United States' WPI (1990=100). 
International Financial Statistics. 
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The real exchange rate of Chinese yuan with US dollar (USRQ), Japanese yuan (JRQ), 
German Mark (GRQ), UK Pound (UKRQ), and HK dollar (HRQ) Deflated by the ratio of these 
five countries' WPI data (1990=100) and China's CPI data (1990=100); Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Bank Credit Analysis Group. 
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CHAPTERS 
INCENTIVE, CORRUPTION, AND TAX ADMINISTRATION 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the major phenomena in the current world economy is that many countries arc 
decentralizing their fiscal and administrative systems. The United States, Austria, Germany, the 
Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland have been relatively successful in this area as have 
some developing countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. However, China and Russia, the two 
giant transition economies, are still searching for a sound fiscal system to ensure a successful 
transition of their economic reforms. Russia is in the process of decentralizing its fiscal system. 
China, however, seems to be going the opposite direction - centralizing the tax administration 
system. Whether China, Russia, and other countries will be successful or not in reforming their 
fiscal systems remains to be seen. Not surprisingly discussions on fiscal decentralization among 
economists have been increasing. 
Two World Bank scholars, Remy Prud'homme (1994) and Richard Bird (1994) have 
recently contributed to the theoretical work on the issue of decentralization. Even more recently 
Tanzi (1995) presented a review of efficiency and macro economic aspects on fiscal federalism 
and decentralization. He discussed the advantages of decentralization and identified the necessary 
conditions for fully realizing such advantages. In general, economists judge decentralization 
mainly with respect to allocation efficiency. For instance. Gates' decentralization theorem (1972) 
states that public goods should be provided by that level of government which enjoys a 
comparative advantage in providing services to the diversity of preferences. Tiebout (1956) 
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argued that the equalization of marginal benefits of public goods or services to the maximum 
cost yields a Pareto Optimum. Other arguments that favor decentralization include the possible 
experimentation in the provision of the output (Tanzi, 1995), better performance resulting from 
stronger individual incentive (Shah and Qureshi, 1994), and a smaller public sector and more 
efficient economy (Brenan and Buchanan, 1980). 
The theoretical arguments for decentralization are relatively straight forward. But the 
practical experiments to test its superiority are less so. There are various problems that may offset 
the advantages of decentralization. While decentralization is becoming fashionable worldwide, it 
is worth being cautious about the possible negative consequences decentralization may bring, 
especially when corruption at the local level in tax administration and management remains an 
unsolved issue in a country. 
The main objective of decentralization is usually to give greater freedom to local 
governments and firms in fiscal and administrative management. As agents of the central 
government, local governments are expected to serve the objectives of the nation. As providers 
of local public goods, however, local governments have incentives to pursue their own interests. 
When local governments are authorized to grant exemptions from national taxes, they often pass 
on the loss of exempted revenue to the central government. Examples of this problem were found 
in Argentina in earlier years, when four provinces had the legal authority to grant exemptions 
from the national value-added taxes', and in China when local governments had rights of 
negotiating tax contracts with firms under the enterprise responsibility system2 implemented in 
'Tanzi (1995). 
2
 Refer to Section 3.4 for further information. 
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1984. Moreover, when local governments collect taxes on behalf of the central government. 
collusion between local governments and firms becomes more difficult for the central 
government to detect because bribes usually take the form of local public goods. Unless the 
central government enforces effective auditing or punishment schemes, collusion between local 
governments and firms often implies lower tax liabilities for firms, higher revenue for local 
governments, and consequently lower tax revenue for the central government. 
Since China embarked on its historical economic reform in 1979, the decentralization of 
the fiscal system has transferred an increasing share of power in managing the tax administration 
system to local governments3. From 1984 to 1994, local governments in China collected most 
taxes. Unhappy about China's central-local tax-revenue sharing schemes4, local governments 
"hid wealth behind firms", i.e., granted illegal tax breaks to firms in exchange for "voluntary" 
supports for local government-financed projects, and thus caused huge losses to the central 
government's tax revenue. To increase the central government's tax revenue and secure its 
authority in tax collection, China instituted a unified tax system in 1994. The old central-local tax 
revenue sharing schemes were replaced by a new tax source sharing system. For the first time, a 
national tax bureau was set up. There are some signs of success: for instance, during the first half 
of the year in 1995 China's tax revenue increased by 29.1 %5 over the same period in 19946. Still. 
3
 Unless specified, local government refers to all levels of government below the central 
government, including provincial, municipal, county and township governments. 
4
 See Section 3.4 for detailed information. 
5
 This is a nominal term. 
6
 Beijing Review. Vol. 38, No. 32.. August 7-13, 1995. Page 6. 
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"the problem of loss of tax revenue hasn't basically been solved". Finance Minster Liu Zhongli 
told the press7. 
The Russian system of revenue sharing which was inherited from the former Soviet 
Union is facing similar problems to those of China. Unlike most systems of intergovernmental 
finance, in which the center collects and shares most national revenue with lower levels of 
government, revenue in the Russian system is "shared upward" from local governments to the 
federal budgets. Upward sharing contributed to the dissolution of the Union, as republics stopped 
making their transfers. State Tax Service personnel work and live in local areas, they rely on 
local governments for housing and fringe benefits. Private deals between local governments and 
state representatives in favor of local governments' interests have been popular. Moreover, the 
system is not a system but a scries of ad hoc, bargained, non-transparent agreements, whose 
effects and incentives are not well understood8. 
Prud'homme (1994) listed France and Italy as examples showing that corruption is a 
greater problem at the local level. Tanzi (1995) also argued that "corruption may be a more 
common problem at the local level than at the national level, especially in developing countries". 
This paper analyzes the impact of corruption in tax administration at the local level on the 
tax revenue of the central government and of the nation within the framework of the Principal-
Agent model. The model is set up based on the case of China. However, it should also be 
applicable to any country where local governments representing the central government collect 
taxes and have great discretion over the tax administration system. 
7
 The Wall Street Journal, A8, Wednesday, July 26. 1995. 
8
 The information about Russia's fiscal reform is from Wallich (1992). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes methodology. 
Section III presents the state-designed tax regime model, and Section IV the region-designed tax 
regime model. Section V discusses the case of China. Section V summarizes. 
3.2 Methodology 
The standard framework of tax evasion originated with Beck (1968) and Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972). Allingham and Sandmo modeled the problem of tax evasion as a tradeoff of an 
individual between the expected utility gain from an undetected tax evasion and the expected 
utility loss from the penalty that accompanies a detected one. They were followed by a number of 
principal-agent models (Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Border and Sobel (1987), Mookherjee 
and P'ng (1989), Melamad and Mookherjee (1989). Chander and Wilde (1992)) and game-
theoretic models (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Beck and 
Jung (1989), Beck, Davis and Jung (1989)). 
After Beck (1968) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) research on corruption in tax 
administration has been developing along two essentially independent lines. Lui (1986) and 
Cadot (1987) analyzed the consequences of various corruption deterrence schemes. Bhagwati 
(1982), Beck and Maher (1986) focused on the efficiency aspects of corruption, especially in 
developing countries. Besley and McLaren (1993) argued that when tax inspectors and tax payers 
were both dishonest, efficiency wages for the inspectors may not be a good idea to combat high 
levels of corruption due to a lack of "an evenly distributed tax burden, a corrupt pool of potential 
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collectors and strong monitoring."9 The government may have to pay inspectors wages at which 
nobody has an incentive to behave honestly. 
The impact of corruption in tax administration on the game-theoretic model of Graetz, 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) was introduced by Chander and Wilder (1992). They found out 
that "in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher that in its absence. Moreover. 
when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rates of the tax rate to 
reduce expected government revenue."10 
The existing literature on corruption in tax administration has focused on the behavior of 
tax auditors or collectors and tax payers. But when local governments, rather than individual tax 
officials, represent the central government in conducting tax collection, collusion between local 
governments and firms becomes more difficult to detect because bribes often take the form of 
local public goods rather than personal benefits. 
This paper uses the principal-agent framework to discuss the impact of corruption in local 
tax administration on the tax revenue of the country when local governments. In Section (III), the 
central government is the principal who decides all the tax rates and bases, and the local 
government is the agent who conducts tax collection for the central government and then shares 
part of the collected tax revenue with the central government. Our objective is to find out 
whether the decentralization of the fiscal administration contributes to corruption at the local 
level and also to determine the consequences for the tax revenue of the central government 
caused by any such corruption. 
Lesley and McLaren (1993), P. 137. 
10
 Chander and Wilde (1992), P. 333. 
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We will first analyze the case of full information when both central and local 
governments know the firms' income. Then we will employ the result under full information as a 
benchmark to discuss the impact of the asymmetry of information about the firms' income on the 
tax revenue of the government and the welfare of the country. Moreover, since local governments 
collect taxes, they can choose to collude with firms for their own benefit. Thus, the central 
government has to audit firms and design incentive mechanisms for local governments in order 
to prevent them from colluding with firms. Two cases are discussed here: when local 
governments are honest, and when local governments are dishonest and collude with firms. 
In section (IV), we compare the State-Designed Tax Regime Model with the Region-
Designed Tax Regime Model in which the central government chooses the tax revenue sharing 
rate between central and local governments and local governments choose the tax schedules. 
33 The Model 
3.3.1 State-Designed Tax Regime Model 
Assumptions and Notations 
Firms 
Suppose that there are / regions in a country. In each region i. where /= I. 2 / . 
according to their income characteristics firms are categorized into two groups: high-income type 
(/?*,) and low-income type (Ru), with 0<RU < /?*,. The proportion of high income firms in 
region i is a , , and the proportion of low income firms in region / is I - a , . 
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Firms report their income, which is either /?*. or Ru, to their local government i. 
Correspondingly, their tax levels are either X* or X«. and their disposable income are either 
Dhi (i.e. Rtu - X*.) or Du (i.e. R„ - X4). Firms with a low income Ru will always report as a 
Ru type; firms with a high income #*, may have an incentive to report as a Ru type when local 
government i does not know their true income. 
Assumption I. Information about a,. the proportion of high-income firms, is known only by the 
local government that administers the firms but not by the central government. 
Assumption 2. Firms are risk averse. They maximize their expected utility function V(RI - X,). 
which is non-decreasing and concave, i.e. V'(R, - X,) > 0 and V(Rt - X,)< 0. 
Central vs. local government 
Assume that C, is the tax revenue of region i, where C, =a, £ X*. +(l - a , ) £ X„ • 
Moreover, region i keeps (l-r,)C, for its local public goods" ( Z,) and contributes r,C, to 
national public goods ( H,), where r is the tax revenue sharing rate between the central 
government and local government i and a, is the proportion of high-income firms in region i. 
Both the central and local governments' social welfare function can be expressed by 
U(X.Y) = V(X)+W(Y), where X is the quantity of private goods'2 and Y is the quantity of 
1
' Public goods are represented by the tax revenue of the government. 
12
 Private goods are represented by firms' utility functions. 
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public goods. For example, local government <"s social welfare function 
U(X,Y,) = U(Xi;H, ,Z,) is the sum of firm's private goods and local public goods in its region, 
that is, (y(X,;rY,,Z,) = %[y(R*,-X*,)] + 2 [ W ^ - X j ] + » / ( ^ , Z , ) . where H,=r,C, and 
Z, = (l - r, )C(. The central government's social welfare function is thus the sum of firms' private 
goods and local public goods in all the regions of the country, i.e.. 
tkl^-^)+0-a,)Iv'( JR&-Xjl + 5;H//I.Zl)]. 
or 
or 
a , £ v ( S . - X . ) + ( l - a , ) £ v ( « . -X„) +%[tV(r,C,. (l-r,)C,)]. 13.2) 
I 






The Benchmark Case - Full Information: 
Both the local and central governments know the true income affirms. 
Assume that firms' income (/?,) is exogenously given and identically distributed across 
firms. If the central government knows the true income of firms, it can monitor the behavior of 
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firms by setting their tax schedules (X, and X,). Moreover, we assume that the tax revenue 
sharing rates r,l3 is also decided by the central government. 
The central government maximizes its social welfare function: 
MAX % a,%y(7L-x*)+(i-a,)%y(&-xj +£[w(ff,A)]. (3.4) 
or (?•,.*,) 1 a , Z ^ -Xt)+(l-a,)%V(&, -X J +i[w(r,C„ (l-rfc)], (3.5) 
where C,=a,%X*,+( l -a, )%X. 
The first order conditions with respect to X*, and X_b are: 
r- — \ BW 




Rearranging, we have 
dW. V ' ^ - X b ) = V ' ( ^ - X j = —'-r, 
a//. 
(3.8) 
which leads to the equalization of disposable income, i.e., 
Rk, - X* = D», = Rj, - X* = Dk = D, *, 
13
 In China the decision about r is a process of bargaining between the central government and 
local governments. For simplicity, we assume that the central government is solely in power of 
deciding r. 
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The solutions to the maximization problem above therefore are: 
Xk,=Rk.-D^ = Rm~D,*, 
and X. = & , - & , = & , - % * . 
Equation (3.8) implies that the marginal utility of a firm's disposal income is equal to the 
marginal cost of public good. Moreover, when the central government has full information about 
the income of firms, the high-income and low-income firms are equally taxed. They are left with 
the same amount of disposable income after taxes. 
Proposition I: With full information about the income of firms, the central government is 
capable of employing a set of tax schedules so that the high-income and low-income firms arc 
left with the same amount of disposable income. 
Proposition 1 above implies an equal income distribution between high-income and low-
income firms. Such a solution, however, may not be a fair mechanism for high-income firms. To 
solve such an incentive problem, we now suppose that a firm's income Rt is a function of its tax 
level X,. Then the first order conditions with respect to X*, and X_„ are: 
a,V'(R*-xJl!L-\ 
V
 \dX, j 
+ ^ - a , r , = 0 (3.9) 
d/7. " 
and 
i-«,m -&.^-lj+^.(l-a,X =0 (3.10) 
respectively. 
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Rearranging, we have 
BW, 
V ' f i ? * , - X t a ) = - ^ , (3.11) 
v
 ' dR, . 
dX, 
^ ( - . , k 
and V'(RU-Xb) = '— . (3.12) 
Therefore, 
when ^ = ^i~.V'CRlu-X*) = V'(Rkl-Xlu), (3.13) 
dX, dX, v / ' 
when ^>^-,V'(Rh-X*)>V'(Rki-Xtu), (3.14) 
and when - i ^ - < ^ - . V'ffl* -X*,)< V'(/?ta - X J . (3.15) 
The implications of equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15) are the followings: 
Equation (3.13): when an increase in taxes on a high-income firm causes the same 
amount of decrease in its total income as on a low-income firm, then the increase in its utility 
function caused by an increase in its disposal income is the same as that of a low-income firm. 
This result conforms to Proposition I. 
Equation (3.14): when an increase in taxes on a high-income firm causes a smaller 
decrease in its total income compared with that on a low-income firm, then the increase in its 
utility function caused by an increase in its disposal income is higher than that of a low-come 
r *, ,. dR. , dR, 
firm. Note that —=- and —=J- are negatives. 
dX, dX, 
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Equation (3.15): when an increase in taxes on a high-income firm causes a bigger 
decrease in its total income compared that on a low-income firm, then the increase in its utility 
function caused by an increase in its disposal income is lower than that of a low-come firm. 
Asymmetric Information: Firms' Income is a private information of themselves. 
In the case of full information, we have assumed that both the central and local 
governments know the true income of firms. The central government thus has the highest 
freedom in designing tax schedules for firms. In the real world, however, information on firms' 
income is often private. Both the central and local governments do not have the information 
about firms' true income, that is. there exists an asymmetry of information about firms' income 
between firms and the government. In this case, the high-income firms always have an incentive 
to cheat on their tax income report. Therefore, the government has to audit firms in their tax 
income report. Suppose that the probability of detecting a dishonest high-income /?*• firm in 
region t that underreports itself as a R^ type is % , and the cost of auditing is P. Furthermore. 
we assume that the level of auditing is fixed and tax auditing is perfect, i.e., once audited a /?*, 
firm who underreports as a R„ type would be detected by tax auditors without mistake. This firm 
will face a punishment P, once found out cheating. 
Assumption 3: % and p are the same for firms across the regions and are independent of a . the 
proportion of high-income firms and the total amount of tax evasion known to the central 
government14. 
14
 Since only high-income firms have incentives to cheat about their income, the cost of auditing 
P and the probability of auditing q both depend on a , the proportion of high-income firms. We 
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The local government, rather than the central government, conducts tax collection. Local 
governments' interests is to maximize the total amount of their own tax revenue, i.e., local public 
goods, instead of national public goods. Therefore, there is a possibility that local governments 
might collude with firms in search for their own interests. We thus analyze the impact of the 
asymmetric information about firms' income on the tax revenue of the central government under 
the following two cases: tax auditing without collusion and tax auditing with collusion between 
local governments and firms. 
Case A: Tax Auditing without Corruption 
Any high-income firm would be tempted to cheat about his income level only if 
XH. >( l -£)X t o +5(x\ ,+P„) . (3.16) 
Therefore we define the probability of cheating by a high-income firm 
Gfl = I when X*. >( l -5)X„ +%(x*, + P„) (3.17) 
and G„=0 when X* <(l-cJX to+5(x*, + P,,). (3.18) 
If all the local governments are honest in tax collection, i.e., do not collude with firms 
involving "illegal" tax breaks, then the central government's social welfare function is 
_MAX l k l ^ - X . ) + ( l - a J % y ^ - X j l + 2[w(r,C,)|-!34/^IP,G,a, '3-19) 
will assume that a is constant across the regions, thus we adopt a constant cost of auditing here 
also. 
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St. ( l -G/ ,y (^* , -X*, )>G^( l -^^-X^)+G^v( r?* , -X*, -P / , ) , (3.20) 
C,>a,%X^+(l-a , )%X.. (3.21) 
k i 
Equation (3.20) implies that the expected utility of truth-telling for a high-income firm is 
higher than the utility of lying once discovered by auditing15. It is incentive compatible since the 
tax auditing creates an incentive mechanism for a high-income firm not to cheat about its tax 
income. 
The first order conditions with respect to X*., Xj,, and Pfl are 
ax*, • v ' dHt 
G/O-CJVIJK*, -x*,)+(i-G„y'(&t, -x* )+( i - t f c/vfi?*, -X*,) 
+ ( i - 4 ) G / ^ -x to)+$[v(tf» -X^)Gl'(l-^)-GflV'(Rlu -X* -P.) 
-X 
(3.22) 
^ - = - ( l - o l J V ' ( f i . - X , ) + ^ - r I ( l - o 1 ) - C > x 1 P / l c / ( l - § ) 
«X„ on, . (3.23) 
M i - ^ v f * * -x.j+vf** -X* )G/ ( I -$ ) ] 
and 




 This result is derived from the Revelation Principle, i.e. there is nothing to lose for the 
government to concentrate on policies which induces tax payers to report their true income. 
Laffont&Tirole(1994). 
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Rearranging, we have 
( a , + X ( l - G / i ) y ' ^ - X * . ) = 
^ - r , a , + c / ^ , G / ( l - ^ - A . [ ( l - % W ' ^ - X ^ ) + % y ' ( R . - X . - P j | ^ ' 





Substituting equation (3.27) into (3.25) derives 
(a.
 + X(l-G,))v"(7c* - x . ) = ^ - r , a , - ^ . a . G , , ' 
*"' (3.28) 
-G.Vfz^a, -Xv(tf* -X. -P,))-Gr[\(l-l.y(R>. -X.)-qa,| 
SWtffc-x^-pV'fa.-xJ _ _ . 
Therefore, when P, >—i -—'-—i i , V'f/?*, - X*, is smaller than in 
* 2(1-%) v ' 
the case of full information, where - - is the probability of auditing vs. non-auditing. 
( 1 _ s ) 
V(7?A, - X<u - P,) is the utility function of high-income firm once found out cheating, and 
V'^Rk, - X*,) denotes the increase in the utility function of a high-income firm who cheats but 
not found by the government as his disposal income goes up. 
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The asymmetry of information about firms' income between firms and government leads 
to the nonequalization of disposable income of firms. The high-income firms are less taxed than 
in the case of full-information. This result is incentive compatible because it gives high-income 
firms an incentive not to cheat in reporting their tax income to the government. 
Proposition 2: The presence of asymmetric information and incentive compatibility gives high-
income firms information rents — less taxes. 
Furthermore, from equation (3.27). we have 
Gf^[i,P„+W(R* - X „ - P„)] = G„[a, +kV'(Rk, - X* - P„)\. (3.29) 
Multiplying each side by (-1) derives 
( -G^ |a ,P„
 +\V(R. - X „ - P,)]=-G,[a, + i y ' f * t -X\. - P„)]. (3.30) 
By definition of G„{x* - |(l-q)X*, +q(x*. + P„)]l. we know that 




K ' a,/'„Uv(R.-X t l-/'J 
which is less than zero. 
Proposition 3. When the central government raises the penalty for a high-income firm that cheats 
about its income level, the probability of his cheating goes down. 
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Case B: Tax Auditing with Corruption 
Based on the tax revenue sharing rule between the central and local governments 
specified above, the more taxes a local government collects, the more revenue it obtains for its 
own budget; however, in the meantime, the more it contributes to the central government's 
budget. Since the local government is entitled to share only - of national public goods, it might 
like to use all of its taxed income to produce local public good instead of national public good 
because it does not internalize the positive effect of its contributions to national public goods in 
other regions. 
To increase its own income and resources the local government may be willing to wield 
its power in tax collection granung illegal tax relief16 to firms in exchange for donations'7, which 
will become part of its local public goods18. As a result, the local government can attain a higher 
level of tax revenue, firms enjoy less tax burdens, and the central government, however, suffers 
from the erosion of its tax revenue. Therefore, when there is a possibility that local governments 
might collude with firms in tax collection, the central government needs to impose strict 
punishment on disloyal local governments so as to prevent erosion of its tax revenue. 
For any given high-income (/?*,) firm in region / , the maximum amount it is willing to 
transfer to its local government for collusion in tax income evasion is (X*, -X_b) More 
16
 They will appear legal to the central government since it does not have the correct information 
about firms' income. 
17
 Sometimes, however, firms contribute involuntarily so as to maintain a friendly relationship 
with their local government. 
18
 Refer to Section 3 4 for discussion about the Mtuauon in China. 
58 
reasonably, we assume that the collusion bribe that a /?*, firm gives to local government / is 
Y,(x»t - Xj,), where 0<y, < 1, and the magnitude of y, depends on the bargaining power 
between firms and government / I 9 . Therefore, the probability of local government / taking 
bribes is Fm[y,(x.-X,)\. 
To lower the probability of collusion between local government / and firms, the central 
government imposes a punishment fee Pt on local government i if it is found to be colluding 
with firms. In this case, local government i will never accept a bribe from a A*, firm unless the 
expected payoff exceeds the expected penalty20. 
( l-cJy,(Xt-X.):>SP,,. (3.32) 
We define the probability of local government taking bribes as 
^[O-S/Y.f** -X„)-q/ \ , ] . (3.33) 
The tax revenue collected by local government / will thus be 
C, =( l -aJX,+a, [ ( l -5Mt -F j | ^ 
(3.34) 
This assumes that the local government knows exactly the firm's profit level. The central 
government's problem is to solve 
19
 Note that this is a case of collusion before tax auditing. A collusion after tax auditing between 
tax payers and tax auditors will require 7 = 1 . 
20
 In China, the bribes given by firms to local governments usually take the form of "voluntary" 
contributions. Refer to Section 3.4 for further information on this issue. 
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_MAX
 ( t[a,X^-X.)+(l-aj£^.-X.)l + t [v i ; ( r )C1 ) ]+^(P,+P,)x iF f , -P4/ 
(3.35) 
s. t . ( i - f , ,Xa. , -Xt)>f ,Xi -^ 
(3.36) 
C, >(l-a,)X. +a,[(l-^)+^l-Fj]x*,
 +a,Fp{(l-$)[xfc +Y,(%& -X,)]+4(x. + P,)\ 
(3.37) 
The first order conditions with respect to X,. X,. Pfi. and Pt are 
^ = <%,r(7L-x.)+|Jp,{^ 
y(R.-x*,X,Y,(i-W+(i-F„X^-^)+ 
(i-$)[v(7?*, - x„ -y,(x. -xb))Fv'y,(\-^Fvv^ -xu -y,(x,-xup-y,) 





i- = - ( l -a i )V"(P f t -X / l ) 
-r|( l-aJ
 + a,( l -Y,Xl-^,-^/x j i l -q)] ] -^,( ' ' .+ /> ,K'Y,( l -q) 
4 { - ( l - ^ ) f / f -X„ -Y,(X. -Xt))(Y. -l)-(l-cjv(** -X, -Y.(xto - X, ))F„ 'y,} 
(3.39) 
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^ . . ^ l + « 1 + x v ^ - x f c - i v ) . (3.40) 
and 
dP. ^ = $a1(-P,^ + F)+cJa1P,/'K) 
+^r , [a ,4X.c / ' - f ^aXl -^X,+Y, l / * . -%.) ] -na,^+^) ] 
+X,{v(Sfc - X ^ + V ^ -X, -?,(** - X,))(l-cJ(F^)+c^v(/?te -X*. - P,)} 
(3.41) 
respectively. 
Comparing the changes in firms' utility functions under the cases of corruption and no 
corruption is almost impossible because different sets of variables are involved. We can however 
determine how the central government's welfare function ( MAX ) changes when it increases the 
penalties for both colluding local governments and cheating firms. 
OMAX aw, 3C, 
^ ^ ^ 
(3.42) 
dF„ 
where — = ~FV %, 





tX.i&rfctfXtF.' - a ^ l - c j X .
 +Y,(X. -XH)]^{X. + P „ | 
*J§-P,,Fm'l + Fm-PmFm'(\ 
= a£F„ -a,^F;[p/1 + P r ] - | ^ r a , ^ ; [ ( l - ^ X f c + Y l ( x . -X.)]+S(x\,+P„)] 
(3.43) 
This relationship is difficult to sign. By construction when the central government raises 
the level of Pcl to a certain level, Fv will go to zero. Raising Pgl beyond that point causes f „ to 
become negative. So the increase Pv might have an ambiguous effect on the central 
government's welfare function. 
hC 
where—- = a,qFv. 
Therefore. = —-r + l kx £F which is greater than zero. This implies that 
ar„, la//, r ' 
raising the penalty for a cheating firm will increase the central government's social welfare level. 
To find out how the probability of colluding /\,|(l-q)y,(x*. ~X&)-qP, change 
when the central government raises the penalty for a colluding local government Pv. we divide 
—— by F% and obtain 
dPv 
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-S*/,. +yr-&.P,. -^r,[aX\-q\xu +Y<(X* -X,)] + «,^,] 
-A.{v(*fc - x . ) + w ^ -x« -Y,(%& -2C.)Xi-4)+^*. -Xt-P„)}=0 
(3.45) 
Or 
f ^ = ^ ,(p,+pJ+A-6. (3.46) 
where 
A = ^r\aX\-$\xu+y,(X>.-Xb)\+*,qPn] 
fl = x{v(tffa - x\,) + v(7?*, -X, -Y,(X„ - X ^ l - c J + c ^ * . " ** " f,)} 
(3.47) 
Rearranging gives us 
F' 
F„ ^ , ( P , + P j + A - 8 (3.48) 
ar. From the definition of f„|(l-5)y,(x\, - X 4 ) - c / f J , we know that ^f- = Ff. H ) 
Therefore, 
BF 
BP. "-< PJtAO+F« +^//H)+^fp/H) (3.49) 
which is less than zero. 
Proposition 4. When the penalty for a colluding local government P, increases, the collusion 
bribe decreases, and the probability of colluding Ftl also decreases. 
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From the analysis above, we can see that to prevent the collusion between the local 
government and firms, the central government is forced to resort to expensive and expansive tax 
auditing, which erodes the tax revenue of the central government. 
What if the local government is given the right to set tax schedules and the central 
government only decides the tax revenue sharing formula between the central and local 
governments? Will the central government's tax revenue increase? To answer this question, we 
compare which model, State-Designed or Region-Designed Tax Regime, contributes to a higher 
tax revenue for the country. 
3.3.3 Region-Designed Tax System - Federalism: 
The central government chooses the tax revenue sharing rate between central and 
local governments; the local government chooses tax schedule. 
When local governments are authorized to set the tax schedules and then share the 
collected tax revenue with the central government, they can collude with a high income (7?*,) 
firm in their regions before collecting taxes. Suppose that local government < acquires 
Y,(X*. - Xfi) from a /?*. firm as the collusion bribe for covering it as a Ru type, otherwise. 
punishes him by imposing Pt, a monetary representation of possible economic and political 
damages to the firm. 
The high-income firm colludes with local government only if 
*(x*-Xb)+Xk>(l-ct)Xl.+$(xt. + Pl,). (3.50) 
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(I, 
We define the probability of colluding as 
f/,[r,(Xt - X . ) + X . -(l-QX* -S(Xt + P„)\. (3.51) 
Then local government's social welfare function is as follows: 
Max a ,£v( /L -X*)+(l-a,)%y(&, - X j + w f ^ - . (l-r,)C,l-Pq+a.xJr.fx. -X 
(3.52) 
St. (\-Kf,yfR^-X^)<Kf,(l-^y(Rlu-Xl,)+K^v{Rlu-'Xlu-P,). (3.53) 
C, = ( l -a ( )X ,+a , ( l -G f ( )X t e 
(3.54) 
Substituting X^ = <j>(x*.) and into the objective function, we have immediately ( since 
we are at a maximum) 
Proposition 5: As the number of regions increases, for a given sharing of tax revenue between 
the central government and the regions, the amount of tax raised and therefore both the local and 
national public goods decrease. 
Fiscal federalism leads clearly to less resources for the central government if the tax 
schedules are set by the local government. The central government may increase its share to 
65 
preserve national public goods but this would further decrease the social welfare of local 
government. 
3.4 Corruption in Tax Administration: the Case of China 
Before January 1,1994, China's tax administration system had two salient features. First. 
almost all the tax bases and rates were set by the central government. Local governments had 
little autonomy in constructing their own tax system2'. Second, local governments collected 
virtually all the major taxes. Moreover, under the enterprise responsibility system introduced in 
1980, local governments were authorized to assign tax contracts to local firms. Thus, local 
governments had considerable leeway in manipulating the taxation administration system. The 
degree of decentralization in tax administration in China was the highest in the world. 
In 1982, when the "Fiscal Revenue Sharing" system between the central and local 
governments was implemented, tax income from local firms became the primary source of local 
governments' fiscal revenue. However, since the total amount of local governments' tax revenue 
collection was subject to sharing with the central government, local governments preferred not to 
collect the maximum amount of taxes from local firms but to grant them generous tax contracts 
or illegal tax exemptions22 and then collect "voluntary" contributions from them to finance local 
projects. Such a collusion between local governments and local firms was described as "hiding 
wealth behind firms". The "Fiscal Contracting" system, introduced in 1988,encouraged more 
21
 Local governments are entitled to set surtax rates on a small number of taxes and collect a set 
of extra budgetary fees and charges. Bahl and Wallich (1992, Page 7). 
22
 These contracts would seem legal to the central government because it does not know the tax 
income of enterprises. 
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dramatic hoarding of wealth behind firms by local governments since local governments were 
still forced to submit an increasing amount of tax revenue to the central government if they 
collected more. Therefore, while the total amount of tax revenue of local governments needed 
not have increased, their benefits from colluding with local firms in tax collection had made them 
better off. The central government's tax revenue, on the other hand, declined as a percentage of 
national income (Figure 3.1). 
On January 1, 1994. China introduced a new tax sharing system. The central and local 
governments now collect their own taxes and share revenues of specified taxes. In the past two 
years the tax revenue of the central government has increased. However, the problem of tax 
revenue erosion has not been completely solved as local governments had soon found out new 
ways of manipulating the new tax revenue sharing system to their own benefits23. 
High inflation and income disparity among regions are the major challenges of the current 
Chinese economy. The growing budget deficits, magnified by the corruption at the local level in 
the tax administration system, however, inhibits the central government solve them efficiently. 
Thus, the weakening of its power to control the overall economy has become the major concern 
of the central government. 
The Evolution of China's Central-Local Fiscal Relationship 
China's fiscal system was established in the early 1950s as a part of the centrally planned 
economy. Recognizing the importance of mobilizing the local governments' initiatives in tax 
administration, the central government launched various reforms to decentralize the fiscal 
23
 Refer to the last topic "The 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform" in this section for further information. 
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management system. However, each time it took a major step toward decentralization, some 
follow-up centralization adjustments were applied to offset the power of local governments in 
fiscal management. In sum, the fiscal relationship between the central and local governments has 
been characterized by a process of "centralization-decentralization-re-centralization". 
Before 1979 
The pre-1949 highly decentralized fiscal administration system was replaced with a 
highly centralized and unified one in 1950, under which the central government controlled the 
budgets of all levels of government. The fiscal revenue of the governments consisted of the 
following four sources: "local fixed revenue", "central government fixed revenue", "revenue 
shared at a fixed rate", and "central government revenue shared by adjustment". The adjustment 
revenue, composed of the commodity tax and the commodity circulation tax, was subject to 
change on a yearly basis. The agricultural tax and the industrial and commercial income tax"4 
served as the revenue shared at a fixed rate between the central government and local 
governments. Each year the local governments' budgets were checked and ratified by the central 
government. Local governments financed their expenditures from their fixed and shared 
revenues. If a local government could not cover the shortfall between its revenue and 
expenditure, the central government would allocate a fixed amount of adjustment revenue to that 
24
 The industrial and commercial income tax (ICTT) was applied in 1950 to all enterprises. It was 
a tax on gross business receipts or earnings, with rates ranging from 5.75 percent to 34.5 percent. 
Since 1958 state owned enterprises were exempted from the ICIT. Local governments were 
allowed to impose an additional 10-100 percent local surtax charges. Bachman (1987), Page 126. 
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local government in order to maintain its budget balanced. But local governments were allowed 
to retain their surplus of budget revenue and freely use it during the following fiscal year. 
Moreover, the "control of budgetary totals" was applied by the central government to replace 
"item-by-item control" so that local governments gained greater freedom in constructing their 
own budgets. 
From 1950 to 1958 most of the fiscal revenue was under the control of the central 
government in order to support national capital construction. In 1958, for the first time, local 
governments were designated as agents of the central government to manage some firms and 
entitled to twenty percent of the revenues from them. Moreover, the revenue sharing rules 
between the central and local governments were adjusted every five years, rather than annually. 
This enabled local governments to construct their budgets more flexibly with a five-year horizon. 
Soon after the reforms in 1958 were introduced, the central government evaluated them 
as diverting and decentralizing the national fiscal revenue, and subsequently weakening its ability 
of managing the macroeconomy25. Therefore, starting in January 1961, the central government 
reversed some of the features of the 1958 reform. For example, the period of adjustment for the 
sharing revenue division between the central and local governments was changed back from a 
five year period to an annual period. 
In 1970, provincial authorities were authorized to control the tax schedules of communes, 
brigade, and team industries and to supervise the majority of firms. After 1972. some 
Lardy (1981) argued that the 1958 reform did not impair the central government's ability to 
control the allocation of economic resources. It had affected the central government's fiscal 
control mechanism only marginally. 
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centralization adjustments were again applied. For instance, the locally collected and used 
revenue from the real estate tax and the vehicle and ship licensing tax were required to be shared 
between the central and local governments. 
From the above description, we can conclude that before 1979 the central government in 
China had overall control over the fiscal and tax system. Although local governments collected 
most of the taxes, it was the central government that set all the tax rates and bases. Local 
governments had to submit almost all of their tax revenues (except a small portion of fixed local 
revenue) to the central government. With little autonomy over their own budgets and taxation 
system, local governments had little incentive in tax collection and fiscal management. 
77ie "Fiscal Revenue Sharing" System and Firms Responsibility System 
To provide local governments greater incentives for tax collection, the "Fiscal Revenue 
Sharing" scheme was implemented in 1980. Revenues of a set of specified taxes were shared 
between two governments one level apart, for instance, the central government and provincial 
governments or the provincial governments and municipal governments26. The central 
government set the central-provincial sharing rates. Within each province the provincial 
government determined the sharing rates for their own local governments. The central 
government's fixed fiscal revenue included income of taxes on firms under its own jurisdiction 
(i.e. central firms) and tariffs. The local governments' fixed revenues included tax income from 
firms under their jurisdiction (i.e. local firms), salt tax. agricultural tax. and local taxes. The 
Bahl and Wallich (1992, Page 5) provides a description of the structure of governments in 
China 
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industrial and commercial tax served as the source of adjustment revenue. The central 
government's expenditures included central capital construction investment, central firms' 
circulating funds, defense funding, and foreign aid. Local governments' fiscal expenditures 
included local capital construction investment, local firms' working capital, agriculture funds, 
city construction, education-science-hygiene, and social welfare. Special expenditures (for 
example, natural disaster relief fund, the development fund for underdeveloped areas, etc.) fell 
under the central government's budget. 
The "Fiscal Revenue Sharing" system created a series of problems such as short run 
behavior, "adverse selection"27, and "moral hazard"28 at the local level. The most important 
change under the "Fiscal Revenue Sharing" system was that the central and local governments' 
revenues were coming primarily from central firms and local firms respectively. Thus, it was in 
the interest of local governments to develop those local firms which quickly generated large 
profits. Those projects that yielded profit slowly were important for the national economy in the 
long run (for example, infrastructure industry) were neglected. Moreover, to protect inefficient 
industries in their own regions, local governments set up various barriers and blockades of 
industry development among regions. All of these were reflections of local governments' short 
run behavior. 
To pursue their own interests, local governments wanted to keep as much revenue as 
possible within their regions rather than share them with the central government. This objective 
was often pursued by granting generous tax contracts29 to local firms in exchange for "voluntary" 
27
 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1993). 
28
 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1993). 
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contributions from them. In this way, local governments could "hide wealth behind firms". The 
amount of illegal tax exemptions and benefits, legitimately a part of the central government's tax 
revenue, were instead contributed solely to the revenue of local governments. 
One of the examples of the "adverse selection" behavior of local governments was that 
highly developed provinces (which were expected to be the significant contributors to the fiscal 
revenue of the central government), exerted less effort at tax collection than the poorly developed 
provinces30. 
The "Fiscal Contracting" System 
To solve the problem of "hiding wealth behind firms". China implemented the "Fiscal 
Contracting" system in 1986. Provincial governments contracted with the central government for 
a tax quota, above which provincial governments could retain most or all of the revenue. Within 
each province there were similar contracts between provincial governments and their own local 
governments. 
From 1986 to 1990 there were six basic types of sharing schemes between the central 
government and provincial governments: 
29
 Under the enterprise contract responsibility system implemented in 1984 local governments 
were responsible for assigning to and negotiating the tax contracts with enterprises, and thus had 
tremendous leeway in manipulating the enterprise taxation system. For example, to account for 
the ad hoc factors related with the enterprises' profitability, the adjustment tax was applied. Tax 
rates thus varied significantly between enterprises as a result of negotiations between enterprises 
and governments; domestic and foreign enterprises faced different tax rates, as did enterprises 
with different ownership. 
30
 Balh and Wallich (1992) and Prime (1992). 
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1. Fixed Sharing. The provincial or municipal governments remit a fixed proportion of 
tax revenues to the central government (Tianjin, Shanxi and Anhui). 
2. Fixed Sharing Adjusted bv Growth Rate. Based on the 1987 amount of tax revenue, 
when tax revenues are growing between 3.5 and 6.5 percent, the provincial or municipal 
government retain 28 to 80 percent of their increased revenues. When the growth rate of the tax 
revenue is above 6.5 percent, the provincial governments retain all of that additional tax revenue. 
(Ten provinces and cities) 
3. Incremental Sharing. The provincial or municipal governments retain a certain 
proportion of tax revenue up to a quota, and then a different (usually higher) proportion above 
the quota. (Dalian, Qingdao and Wuhan). 
4. Fixed Quota Delivery. The provincial or municipal government turns in a specified 
nominal amount of tax revenues to the central government. (Shanghai. Shandong-except Qingdao 
City, and Heilongjiang-except Harbin City). 
5. Fixed Quota with Growth Adjustment. The provincial or municipal governments turn 
in a specified nominal amount of tax revenues to the central government in the first year, and 
amounts that grow at a decreasing rate in the subsequent years. (Guangdong and Hunan). 
6. Fixed Subsidy. Fourteen provinces and cities are subsidized by the central government. 
Under the "Fiscal Contracting" system, taxes on local firms remained as the core of the 
local governments' budget revenues. However, the amount of extra-budgetary revenues increased 
quickly3'. The extra-budgetary revenues included local taxes (such as the slaughter tax. the 
31
 During the Maoist period, the extrabudgetary revenues constituted about \%-2% of revenue 
collection in rich provinces and no more than 5% for most provinces. During the reforms, there 
has been an estimated six fold nationwide increase in extrabudgetary revenues. Oi (1992), Page 
105. 
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individual income adjustment tax, and the tax on private firms) and nontax revenues (such as the 
various fees and surcharges). Before the implementation of the "Fiscal Contracting" system, all 
use of extra-budgetary funds needed approval of the upper-level government. After that, local 
governments were allowed to use these "extra-budgetary revenues" at their own will. 
The "Fiscal Contracting" system didn't solve, but exacerbated, the problem of "hiding 
wealth behind firms". First, as under the "Fiscal Revenue Sharing" system, relatively rich 
provinces were assigned low-powered tax revenue schemes under the "Fiscal Contracting" 
system so that they did not have strong incentives in tax collections32. The more tax revenue local 
governments collect, the more they have to remit to the central government. High sharing rates 
(or low retention rates), therefore, discourage local governments from exerting efforts at tax 
collection. Second, the contracted tax quotas are growing based on those of the previous year. 
The more taxes local governments collect this year, the higher the contracted tax quotas they will 
have to achieve next year. Third, local governments contract only for profits, not for deficits. 
That is, when local government revenues are greater than their expenditures, they have to remit 
the contracted revenues to the central government. But, if local governments' revenues cannot 
cover their expenditures, they would receive subsidies from the central government. The "Fiscal 
Contracting" created the so called "whipping the fast cows" phenomenon. 
To escape from whipping by the central government as the fast cows under the "Fiscal 
Contracting" system while increasing their own revenues, local governments continued to pursue 
again the "moral hazard" behavior as under the "Fiscal Revenue Sharing" system, i.e.. "hide 
Refer to Appendix for detailed information. 
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wealth behind firms". Illegal tax holidays and exemptions given to local firms led to the erosion 
of the total amount of tax revenue of the central government. 
Evidence of Collusion: Tax Evasions and Illegal Charges 
As argued above, although the central government sets tax rates and bases and local 
governments have little independence in structuring their own tax system, local governments 
have substantial discretion in tax administration. They are able to grant tax relief to local firms 
without legal approval from the central government. 
Usually the enterprise income tax rate is not negotiable. However, "what can be written 
off as costs is largely at the discretion of the local officials charged with assessing the tax....until 
the rule change of the late 1980s, income tax was commonly reduced by allowing firms to deduct 
loan payments from income before assessing the tax. In addition, there are areas that grant 
across-the-board cuts as standard practice In the eastern province of Zhejiang, for example, if 
the applicable tax rate is above 30 percent, then the amount taxed at the higher rate is cut in 
half."33 Taxes on sales and value-added taxes have been more enforced and collected more than 
the income tax. But in state industry there was room for reduction and exemptions34. 
Between 1985 and the middle of 1993 the total evaded taxes captured by the government 
were 9 billion yuan35 However, the actual taxes evaded were much higher. The estimated 
number from one of the most influential Chinese papers. Economic Reference, was 100 billion 
33
 Oi, 1992. Page 106. 
34
 Oi (1992, Page 109) gave some specific examples in his article. 
35
 Caizheng yanjiu ziliao. 1994, No. 1. 
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yuan each year (July 31, 1993). Therefore the fiscal revenue system in China is often described as 
a sifter with tax revenue "leaking" everywhere. 
Various tax evasions caused the effective tax rates to drop far below their nominal levels. 
For example, the nominal and effective rates are respectively 11% and 8% for the turnover tax 
rate. 33% and 6% for tariffs. 55%, and 30% for the state enterprise tax rate, and 3% for the 
agriculture tax36. 
According to researchers of the Economic and Foreign Trade Commission in China. 
seventy percent of the illegal charges and fees imposed on firms by local governments are 
claimed for supporting local public services, twenty percent for education service (for instance. 
employees' children's school-enrollment fees ), and the rest could be in any name (for instance. 
police or detective fees and tree planting fee). 
What is bizarre about these illegal charges and fees is that eighty percent of them are 
written in governmental "Red Heading Documents"37. The names of illegal charges and fees are 
usually constructed in a very confusing, but apparently legal manner. Since 1992 Henan province 
has removed more than twenty kinds of illegal fees, such as employee-training fee, employee 
salary adjustment fee, temporary employee registration fee, insurance form fee, production 
standardization test fee. family planning fee, social welfare fee, medical facility fee, and special 
loan evaluation fee. 
Another feature of illegal charges and fees is that they are all "voluntary" donations from 
firms. However, firms donate money "voluntarily" only because they know that otherwise they 
36Lu(1993). 
35
 The official documents of the Chinese Communist Party always use red headings. 
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will face unpredictable problems from local governments. A survey of ten big and medium size 
metallurgy firms in Hunan province reported that from 1992 to 1993, the total illegal charges and 
fees were 10.38 million yuan, with an average of 1.13 million yuan for each enterprise38 
(including those which could not pay the full amount of salaries of their employees). For 
example, the Xiantan Steel and Iron Plant paid all kinds of illegal charges and fees to 75 
organizations from 1992 to 1993. One can say that almost any organization which directly or 
indirectly controls or regulates firms is capable of imposing illegal charges on firms. 
The 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform 
The fourteen-year fiscal reform has achieved one of its goals, that is, to give local 
governments greater autonomy over their budgets and greater incentives for tax administration. 
However, the reform did not solve the problem of "hiding wealth behind firms", the erosion of 
the central government's tax revenue, and the local governments' short-run behavior. To solve 
the problem of shrinking tax revenue and regain the control of tax administration, the central 
government on January 1,1994 pushed forward the new tax-sharing scheme. 
Under the new tax-sharing system, tax revenues are redistributed between the central and 
local governments. The central government will transfer 50 percent of the urban land utilization 
tax, 30 percent of the cultivated land occupation tax, and 5 percent of the state-owned land sales 
tax revenue to local governments. Local governments will submit revenue from 100 percent of 
the consumption tax, 75 percent of the VAT-value added tax, 100 percent of the financial 
institution income tax, and 100 percent of the securities transaction tax. to the central 
Unfortunately I do not have the amount of legal taxes available at present. 
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government. The central government will retain 100 percent of the offshore petroleum tax 
revenues. 
Tax reductions and exemptions granted by provincial governments before June 1993 are 
enforceable until 1995 as long as they are reexamined and approved by the Ministry of Finance 
and the National Tax Bureau. 
To prevent local governments from manipulating the taxation system and to regain the 
central government's control over the tax revenues, China is establishing national tax bureaus 
regionally, which are directly responsible for collecting taxes that belong to the central 
government. However, the national tax bureau staff are those transferred from the old unified 
local tax bureaus. They rely on local governments for housing, children's education, and fringe 
benefits. They therefore may be tempted to sacrifice the benefits of the central government while 
facing conflicts of interest between the central and local governments. 
In the first half year of 1994 the total fiscal revenue in the country was 197.9 billion 
yuan39, which is 22.6 percentage points higher than that during the same period of 1993. 
Specifically the VAT revenue increased by 35.7 percent and the business tax by 45.7 percent.40 
During the first half of the year in 1995 China's tax revenue increased by 29.1% over the same 
period last year4'. These figures, argued Minister of Finance, Mr. Zhongli Liu. indicate a 
decrease in the illegal tax reductions and holidays granted by local governments42. 
'
9
 It is a nominal figure without discount of the effect of inflation. 
40
 People s Daily (Overseas Edition), August 3. 1994. 
41
 Beijing Review. Vol. 38, No. 32.. August 7-13. 1995. Page 6. 
42
 It is quite likely that these figures of increases in the tax revenue are not corrected for inflation. 
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According to the official report in the People's Daily , however, local governments 
learned how to manipulate the new tax sharing system in only a few months. For example, some 
local governments grant their firms 100 or 50 percent of exemptions on the consumption tax, or 
reduce the 33 percent of enterprise income tax rate to 15 percent. Since local authorities collect 
most taxes, they show little desire to put the squeeze on taxpayers if the revenues do not accrue 
to them. Despite sky high nominal customs duties, actual customs revenues have fallen steadily 
to a mere 4% of total imports as local governments hand out liberal tax breaks44. All of these 
illegal strategies are shaping at all levels of governments - provincial, municipal, and county. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The argument for a more decentralized fiscal system usually stems from the need for an 
efficient distribution of local public goods. In China, it is based on the role local governments 
can play in assisting the fast development of markets. However, if decentralization breeds 
corruption or brings other negative consequences, which may offset the potential advantages of 
decentralization, then decentralization may not be the optimal path of fiscal reform for every 
country. The results of this paper show that when local governments are authorized to collect 
taxes from or assign tax contracts to firms, the corruption in tax administration at the local level 
becomes more extensive and more difficult to detect. It may cause an erosion of the tax revenue 
of the central government and consequently restrict its ability to control the economy. Angang 
People's Daily (Overseas Edition). August 8. 1994. 
44
 The Wall Street Journal. A8, Wednesday. July 26, 1995 
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Hu, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, commented on the fiscal reform in China. 
"Decentralization has already gone too far"45. 
Appendix: The Incentive Design of the Chinese Fiscal Contracting System 
77ie Power of Incentive Schemes 
Laffont & Tirole (1994, Page 6) defined the power of incentive scheme in a procurement 
contract. Suppose that the government reimburses a fraction be [0,l]of the firm's monetary 
expenditures c and then pays a net transfer t to the firm, 
t = a-bc, 
where a is a "fixed fee" and b is the fraction of costs bom by the firm; b is defined as the 
power of the incentive scheme. 
When 6 = 0, the firm does not bear any of its cost. Therefore, this is an extremely low-
powered incentive scheme and called a cost-plus contract. 
When b = I, the firm is residual claimant for its cost savings. The government does not 
reimburse any of the cost; it pays only a fixed fee. This is an extremely high-powered incentive 
scheme and called a fixed-price contract. 
When b is strictly between 0 and 1, the government and the firm share the cost. The 
higher the value of b. the bigger the fraction of cost the firm bears, and the higher the power of 
the incentive scheme. On the other hand, the lower the value of b, the smaller the fraction of 
45
 The Wall Street Journal. A8, Wednesday, July 26, 1995. 
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cost the firm bears, and the lower the power of the incentive scheme. This is a case of linear 
"incentive contract". 
The Chinese "Fiscal Contracting" System 
Let c,' represent the contracted tax revenue quota of the local government, c, the amount 
of actual tax revenue collection of the local government, and r, the proportion of contracted tax 
revenue quota that belongs to the central government, and mr, the proportion of above quota tax 
revenue claimed by the central government. There are six basic types of sharing schemes 
between central and local governments under the "Fiscal Contracting" system. The local 
government's tax revenue (T() is as follows: 
1. Fixed Sharing 
7 > ( l - r f ) c , \ 0 < / ; < l . 
2. Fixed Sharing Adjusted by Growth Rate 
7J = (l-r,)c, '+(l-mr;)(c-c, ') , where 0<r,. mr, < 1. 
3. Incremental Sharing 
T, = (l -r,)c,", where 0< r, < I, and c'increases as r'decreases. 
4. Fixed Quota Delivery 
T, = c, - c,*, where
 c, is fixed, specified, and nominal. The local government submits 
c/ to the central government and retains the rest (c, -c') to its own budget. 
5. Fixed Quota with Growth Adjustment 
T,=c,~c', where c' increases in t but at a decreasing annual rate. 
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6. Fixed Subsidy 
T,=c,+s,', where s,' is the central government's subsidy to the local government. 
These six schemes above can be incorporated into a general formula, since 
7 ;=( l - r , ) c ; + ( l -mr , ) (c -c ; ) + V=> 
Scheme 2,where 0 < rt,mrt < I, and 5,' = 0. 
Scheme 1, where mrt = I, 0 < rt < 1, and S' = 0. 
Scheme 3, where mrt = I, 0 < rt < 1, and S,' = 0. When ct* increases, r," decreases. 
Scheme 4, where mrt =0, r, = 1, S,' = 0, and ct* is fixed and norminal. 
Scheme 5, where mrt =0, r, = 1. S,' = 0,and c' increases in t but at a annual deacreasing rate. 
Scheme 6. where mrt = 0. c,' = 0. 
Measuring the Power of Incentive of the Chinese "Fiscal Contracting" System 
The power of incentive scheme in a procurement contract is measured by the fraction of 
costs born by the firm. The higher the fraction of cost bom by the firm, the higher the power of 
incentive scheme. If the firm is responsible for the full cost, then it can claim residual savings of 
costs. In this case, the firm has the highest incentive in cost savings. Similarly, under the Chinese 
"Fiscal Contracting" system, the power of incentive of the local government in tax collection 
depends on to what extent the local government is entitled to the residual increase in its tax 
collection. If the local government claims all the residual increase in its tax revenue collection. 
then the local government has the highest incentive in tax collection. 
Under the "Fiscal Contracting" system, scheme 4 (Fixed Quota Delivery) offers a fixed 
and nominal tax revenue sharing contract for the local government. After the local government 
submits the contracted tax quota to the central government, it could retain the rest of its tax 
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revenue collection to its own budget; the local government is thus the residual claimant for any 
increase in its actual tax revenue collection. The local government would like to collect as much 
taxes as it can from firms to maximize the total amount of its tax revenue. In this case, like a 
fixed-price contract, the power of incentive in tax collection is very high; the local government 
does not have incentives to collude with firms involving any illegal tax transactions. 
Result I: Under the Fixed Quota Delivery scheme, corruption in tax administration 
between the local government and firms is constrained by the local government's own benefit 
from honest tax collection. 
The power of incentive of local governments in tax collection under scheme 5 (Fixed 
Quota with Growth Adjustment) is second only to that under scheme 4 since c' increases at a 
decreasing rate every year under scheme 5. while c,* is fixed under scheme 4. 
Scheme 6 (Fixed Subsidy) guarantees that the local government receives net subsidies 
from the central government to make up for whatever the difference between the amount of tax 
revenue the region collects and the total amount of tax revenue it needs46. The local government 
does not have any incentive to collect the maximum amount of taxes. In fact, usually the less the 
tax revenue they collect, the more the subsidies they will get from the central government. So 
they prefer to leave taxes to firms so that the latter is willing to contribute to local public goods 
46
 Even though the central government does not cover the difference, the local government has 
nothing to lose. The local government will at least keep a balanced budget and meanwhile a good 
relationship with firms. After a few years, the central government will probably increase its 
subsidies for the local government. 
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by "voluntarily" supporting local government's projects47. In this case, the power of incentive is 
extremely low, or, zero, just like the cost-plus contract where the firm does not bear any cost. 
Result 2: Subsidies from the central government to the local government breeds land for 
corruption between the local government and firms. They also discourage the local government 
to exert efforts on tax collection. 
For a given contracted tax revenue quota, under scheme 1, 2, and 3, the sharing rate rt 
and the above-quota sharing rate mrt serve as the power of incentive of the local government in 
tax collection. As rt and mrt increases, the local government's incentive in tax collection 
decreases since higher rr and mr, imply higher share of tax revenue collections obtained by the 
central government. 
Under both scheme I (Fixed Sharing) and scheme 3 (Incremental Sharing) the local 
government contracts for a specified tax quota with the central government. The difference is that 
under scheme 1. the sharing rate rt is fixed, while under scheme 3 r, decreases as the contracted 
tax revenue collection c," increases (i.e., the central government reaps less revenue as the local 
government collects more). Therefore, the local government has a higher incentive in tax 
collection under scheme 3 than under scheme I. 
Similarly, scheme 2 (Fixed Sharing Adjusted by Growth Rate) gives the local government 
a higher incentive in tax collection than scheme 1 does. Although the sharing rates of the 
47
 The total amount of tax revenue of local government is the sum of its own tax revenue 
collection, subsidy from the central government and colluding fees. 
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contracted tax revenue are both fixed under scheme 1 and scheme 2, the latter allows the local 
government to retain part of its above-quota tax revenue while scheme 1 does not. 
As for scheme 2 and 3, the magnitude of rt, mr,, and the growth rate of c," will decide the 
power of incentive in tax collection. 
It is obvious to see that the power of incentive of the local government in tax collection 
under scheme 1,2. and 3 are all higher than that under scheme 6. 
Compared with scheme 5 and scheme 4, scheme I, 2. and 3 do not give the local 
government the right to claim all of its residual tax revenue collection. The local government has 
to share its collected tax revenue with the central government. 
Result 3: The power of the incentive scheme under the "Fiscal Contracting" system from 
the most powerful to the least powerful goes from scheme 6. 1. 2 or 3 (depending on 
rt. and mr,). 5, and 4, or illustrated as: 
6 -» l -»2o r3 -»5 ->4 
Most least 
Powerful Powerful 
Under the "Fiscal Contracting" system. Fixed Quota Delivery was the most powerful 
incentive scheme, followed by Fixed Quota with Growth Adjustment. Incremental Sharing or 
Fixed Sharing Adjusted by Growth Rate, Fixed Sharing, and Fixed Subsidy. To examine how the 
design of power of incentive the Fiscal Contracting" system affect the country's, especially the 
central government's, total tax revenue, we refer to Table 1 - per capita revenue and per capita 
expenditure data for some of provinces in 1985 grouped by the "Fiscal Contracting" schemes 
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above. As we can see, several relatively rich provinces were assigned with low-powered 
incentive schemes. For examples: Tianjing was under scheme 2, Beijing, Shenyang, Jiangsu, and 
Zhejiang were all under scheme l48. As discussed above, low-powered fiscal incentive schemes 
discourage local governments in tax collection. Therefore, assigned with low-powered incentive 
schemes, those relatively rich provinces and cities had bigger interests in "hiding wealth behind 
firms" than extracting them for the national budget. On the other hand, poor provinces have been 
receiving subsidies from the central government and eroding the nation's the tax revenue. That is 
why the country's tax revenue has been declining since the beginning of economic reform. 
In conclusion, the unbalanced incentive design in central-local tax revenue sharing 
schemes discourage rich provinces. To increase the nation's tax revenue, the Chinese 
government should search for powerful incentive fiscal schemes for local governments. 
48
 Shanghai was the only rich city implementing scheme 4, the most powerful incentive scheme 
under the "Fiscal Contracting" system. The explanation for such an exception is that Shanghai 
has been contributing over one half of China's industrial output for decades. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS TO REGIONS IN CHINA: 
AN EVALUATION OF LUCAS'S CONTENTION 
4.1 Introduction 
In the standard neoclassical model1, the level of physical capital per worker is the only 
determinant of the rate of return to physical capital. Thus, this rate of return will be higher in 
poor countries where the ratio of capital to labor used in the production process is relatively low2. 
Without barriers to international factor movements, capital will tend to flow from developed to 
developing countries until these return differentials are eliminated. Why have these capital flows 
not occurred in the world? 
Traditionally economists emphasized risk and uncertainty regarding capital returns, the 
high costs (transportation, telecommunication, and distribution, etc.) associated with production. 
the level of taxation, and the overall availability of economic and social infrastructure in 
developing regions or countries. They argued that improvements in any of these determining 
factors can relocate international production as capital is redistributed to the country offering. 
ceteris paribus, the highest real return on its investment. 
In the new endogenous growth models by Romer (1994), Lucas (1988), Barro (1995), and 
others, however, human resources become central to the growth process because human resource 
1
 Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). 
2
 King and Rebelo (1993) have shown that the standard neoclassical growth model predicts post-
war return rate differentials of 799 percent between the U.S. and a sample of poor countries along 
the transition to a steady state. Rebelo (1992) found that a growth model with linear technology 
predicts a 300 percent range of returns across countries. 
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investment can yield positive externalities and increasing returns. "So the growth of per capita 
output does not necessarily have to slow down and eventually converge to the familiar steady 
state. Instead, knowledge and per capita output can grow without bounds"3. 
Lucas (1990) adjusted for differences in human capital, i.e., the skill level of workers, in 
the standard neociassic model. He found that the skill level of workers is so low in India that the 
marginal product of capital is no greater than in the U.S. The predicted rates of returns to 
physical capital are thus equal between a rich country, the U.S. and a poor country, India. That's 
why capital doesn't flow from rich to poor countries, concluded Lucas4. 
However, whether foreign capital flows into a country or not, the endowment of human 
capital is not the only decision variable. There are various other factors that can affect the 
decisions of foreign investors. For example, the host country's trade policy, rate of economic 
growth, legal investment environment, exchange rate, political stability, market size, education, 
production cost, natural resources, and infrastructure, etc., are all to some extent related to the 
actual foreign capital inflows.5 In fact. Ratcliffe (1994) applied Lucas' methodology to 105 
countries over 1960-85 and found that although the predicted differences in marginal products of 
capital are smaller after adjusting for human capital, the differences are too large to be consistent 
with the small capital flows observed. However, adjusting for financial development yields lower 
rates in poor countries than in the U.S. 
3McMahon(1995.P.I). 
4
 Lucas (1990. P. 94). 
5
 Refer to section II for a formal discussion. 
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Huang and Shirai (1994) also tried to answer the question proposed by Lucas "why 
capital doesn't flow from rich to poor countries" from the aspect of information externalities by 
using China as an example. They argued that the searching process of individual investors for 
new investment opportunities and the information externalities of investors (the transmission 
mechanism from pioneer investors to potential investors) to some extent decide the dynamic 
pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries: initially the inflow of FDI is 
sluggish, followed by a period of considerable fluctuation before finally entering the stage of 
rapid growth. The reasons are first, in the the early stage of investment it may be time-consuming 
and costly for foreign investors to search for new investment opportunities. Moreover, there 
exists a high degree of uncertainty about the overall investment environment. The FDI in China 
well illustrated such a dynamic pattern. 
This paper will, for the first time, use China's provinces as a controlled environment to 
examine how Lucas' evidence fits in the case of China and to find out the determinants that drive 
FDI into China. I first employ Lucas (1990) methodology to compute the rates of return to capital 
for twenty eight provinces6 in China. I will compare their rates of return to physical capital (in 
the neoclassical model) and the rates of return to human capital (in the neoclassical model 
adjusted for human capital) to determine whether human capital differences between provinces 
within China are an important variable in explaining their different rates of return. Then, I 
conduct an empirical test to identify the mam factors besides human capital that determine 
foreign capital inflows into provinces in China. In the various regions of China foreign investors 
face broadly similar currency and political risks, foreign investment regimes, cultural and 
6
 Gansu and Hainan are not included for lack of data. 
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historical factors, and time since capital began flowing in. However, there are large variations in 
product, education, infrastructure, etc., between them. 
Theoretical and previous empirical evidence on the determinants of foreign direct 
investment are presented in section II. The developments of FDI in China are discussed in section 
III. Ratios of return rates for China's twenty-eight provinces are computed in section IV. The 
empirical test is conducted in section V. The conclusion is provided at the end of the paper. 
4.2. The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows: A Literature Review 
Brewer (1993) grouped the determinants of foreign direct investment into three 
categories: microeconomic, macroeconomic, and macro-political determinants: 
Microeconomic determinants 
The differential rates of return (Agarwal, 1980) theory argues that foreign direct 
investments flow from countries with low rates of return to countries with high rates of return. 
Assuming that the marginal cost of capital is the same in both home and foreign countries, if 
expected marginal returns are higher abroad than at home, there is an incentive to invest abroad 
rather than at home. 
The portfolio diversification theory believes that when a firm has to choose among 
different projects, it is guided not only by their expected returns but also by their expected risks. 
Since the returns on activities in different countries are likely to have less than perfect 
correlation, a firm could reduce its overall risk by undertaking projects in more than one country. 
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Foreign direct investment can therefore be viewed as international portfolio diversification at the 
corporate level (Hufbauer, 1975, and Agarwal, 1980). 
Hymer (1976)'s emphasis on market imperfections, especially structural imperfections 
and transaction-cost imperfections, led to the birth of two main groups of theories on foreign 
direct investment: the industrial organization approach and the internalization approach. The 
international organization theory argues that the multinational firm has certain advantages to 
compete against domestic firms such as brand name, patent-protected superior technology, 
marketing and managerial skills, cheaper source of financing, preferential access to markets, and 
economies of scale. The internalization hypothesis explains the existence of foreign direct 
investment as the result of firms replacing market transactions with internal transactions. This is 
seen as a way of avoiding imperfections in the markets for intermediate inputs (see Buckley and 
Casson. 1976). 
The product cycle hypothesis postulates that most products follow a life cycle, in which 
they first appear as innovations and ultimately become completely standardized. Foreign direct 
investment results when firms react to the threat of losing markets as capturing the remaining 
rents from development of the product (Vernon, 1966). 
Dunning and Rugman (85) emphasized industry structure as one of the important 
microeconomic determinants. Hymer (76) argued that oligopolistic industries have economies of 
scale and other characteristics that give them market power and enable them to overcome the 
disadvantages of being foreign and thus compete with local competitors in host countries. 
91 
Moreover, the absence of strong local competitors and the import substitution 
development strategies and protectionism trade policies of the host country are also very 
influential when foreign investors decide whether to invest in a country or not. 
Macroeconomic Determinants 
There are several macroeconomic indicators that are important to foreign investors: the 
rate of economic growth; the size of the economy in terms of per capita GDP (high per capita 
GDP means a high level of consumer purchasing power); industrial capabilities: those that affect 
the efficiency of local suppliers and services; technological infrastructure support systems. 
educational facilities, research and development capacity; Different investment environments 
(regulatory framework or foreign investment regime and fiscal incentives - tax breaks and tax 
holidays, favorable utility usage fees, reduced custom duties and foreign exchange restrictions. 
relaxed ownership controls, and streamlined administration procedures). 
Pfefferman & Madarassy (1992: 5-6) contended that market size is one of the most 
important considerations in making investment location decisions. They also argued that direct 
labor costs are less important while white collar and supervisory labor costs have been rising. 
Relatively high literacy rates and skill levels in the work force become more important. 
Both theory and evidence suggest that FDI is also responsive to exchange rates (Aliber 
70. 71; Froot and Stein, 89, Caves, 88). FDI flows into countries with low real currency values. 
and it flows out of countries with high real currency values. 
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Macro-Political Determinants 
H st country instability is a major determinant in FDI project location decisions. (Frank, 
1980; Green. 1972; Root. 1968). Risks for foreign investors related to political instability include 
potential loss of funds resulting from a political breakup, possible government confiscation. 
uncertain rates of return, disruptions in the supply of goods, services and work force. However. 
empirical tests have found mixed results. Nigh (1985) found that for the developing countries in 
particular FDI flows were related to internal conflicts such as riots and civil war. But a study of 
governmental instability in developing countries found it to be only weakly related to instability 
in their restrictions on international funds transfers associated with FDI projects and less so than 
among developed countries. (Berwer, 1983) 
Host country FDI policies can obviously provide important incentives to prospective 
investors. Recipient countries can employ the following government policies to promote foreign 
capital inflows: monetary and fiscal policies, capital controls, transfer pricing regulations, anti-
trust (i.e., competition ) policy, labor relations policies, intellectual property rights enforcement. 
etc. (UNCTC study. 1992b; Becky. Young, and Ordu, 1991; Brewer. 1991.) Policy measures 
available to developing countries also include a positive attitude toward FDI; liberalizing 
economic policies; seeking different forms of foreign investment; developing human capital; and 
developing industrial capabilities. 
One of the phenomena of the 1980s is that FDI was unevenly distributed among 
developing countries. Regarding the underlying causes, the literature mainly emphasizes 
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economic aspects, and many analyses focus on the demand-side aspects, i.e., conditions in 
developing countries: natural resources endowment; domestic market size; rate of economic 
growth; foreign investment policies and incentives; industrial capabilities. However, one of the 
important underlying causes of the uneven geographical distribution of FDI flows is the changing 
nature of FDI supply. Many of the technical innovations, such as robotics and artificial 
intelligence, are laborsaving. They lead to reductions in production costs, particularly those of the 
labor component. The implications of these technological innovations are several. First, they 
reduce the attractiveness of low cost labor countries as investment locations; Second, countries 
with a skilled labor force (human resource), supporting services and infrastructure are becoming 
more attractive to foreign investors from technologically advanced industries. 
Grub, Lin, and Xia (1990)7 conducted a study and analysis of the factors influencing the 
attitude and motivations of the U.S. investors and found out that market factors are the most 
important determinant of U.S. investment in China, followed by the low labor cost. But, what 
about the skill level of workers? To what extent and at what level is human capital also an 
important decision variable for foreign investors to decide whether to invest in China or not? The 
answer to this question will be analyzed empirically in section IV after an overview of FDI 
developments in China is discussed in section III. 
Schran (1990. pp.96-97). 
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4 J The Development of Foreign Direct Investment in China 
There were virtually no foreign funded firms in China before 1979. However, the Chinese 
Foreign Joint Venture Law promulgated in July 1979 indicated the end of the 30-year period of 
isolation from the outside world. Since then, attracted by its cheap labor force, rich natural 
resources, and potential large market, many foreign investors have come to China seeking new 
investment opportunities. The amount of FDI in China increased rapidly in the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. By the end of 1995, China has approved a total of 258,844 overseas 
funded projects, with an accumulated contractual fund of US$394 billion. Realized FDI value has 
reached a total of US$134 billion8. In terms of import and export value the overseas funded 
enterprise registered US$110 billion in 1995, which accounted for 39% of China's total foreign 
trade. 
During the 1980s, foreign direct investment has been almost continuously declining in 
flows to the developing countries as a group. China, however, has attracted half of the total 
foreign direct investment flowing to the developing countries and stands as the only developing 
country to record a significant increase in inflows of FDI. In 1993 China became the number one 
country in attracting foreign direct investment among the developing countries. China has also 
been the second in foreign direct investment in the world in 1994-95. next only to the United 
States. 
8
 Realized FDI flow data are reported in Table 4.1. Foreign direct investment in China has the 
following four forms: equity joint ventures, cooperative venture, wholly foreign owned 
enterprises, and cooperative development. The values of these four forms during 1979-93 are 
reported in Table 4.2. 
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What has caused the huge inflows of foreign direct investment into China? 
China's sixteen years of experience in building a socialist market economy have 
contributed to the sustained rapid growth of the national economy and particularly the expansion 
of its domestic market. Currently 90% of China's industrial production is determined by the 
market forces8. The retail value of commodities controlled by the government only accounts for 
5.9% of the nation's total9. The sustained growth of the market economy in China has embedded 
the substantial growth of foreign investment Moreover, besides a huge market, a cheap labor 
force, and a complete range of industrial sectors, China now has a sound economic environment 
by employing the regional opening policy and preferential policy for foreign investors. 
In order to create a favorable economic environment for foreign investors, the Chinese 
government has implemented a series of regional opening policies. In 1980 China established 
four special economic zones (SEZs) along the southeast coast - Shenzhen. Zhuhai, Xiamen, and 
Shantou. These SEZs were intended to attract foreign capital and advanced technology and serve 
as the testing grounds for experimental economic and social reform. In 1984, the concept of 
SEZs was extended to another fourteen coastal cities and Hainan Island. Currently, China has 5 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 32 Economic and Technological Development Zones, 52 New 
and High Technology and Industry Development Zones. 13 Bonded Areas. 14 Border Economic 
Cooperation Zones, 11 Tourist Resorts Areas, and designated Open Coastal Cities, Open Cities 
along the Yangtze River. Open Border Cities and Open Provincial Capitals. FDI has been 
concentrating in these regions. 
9
 Zhang (1996). 
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In order to absorb and encourage foreign investment, the Chinese government has set up a 
series of laws and regulations which provide more preferential treatment to foreign investment 
(especially for overseas-funded enterprise with advanced technology) such as import and export 
duty exemption, income tax exemption or reduction, valued-added tax exemption. For example, 
the 1986 new FDI provisions included reducing fees for labor and land use, establishing a limited 
foreign currency market for joint ventures, extending the maximum duration of a joint venture 
agreement beyond 50 years, and permitting wholly foreign-owned enterprises. If foreign 
investment enterprises are established in China's Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Open Cities, 
Economic and Technological Development Zones, Coastal Open Economic Zones, or New and 
High Technology and Industry Development Zones, they will usually be charged a reduced 
corporate income tax rate, which is only half of the income tax rate for Chinese enterprises. The 
recently announced National treatment guarantees the same treatment for both domestic 
enterprises and the overseas-invested enterprises. 
Ever since the opening up to the outside world, China's legal structure has been improved 
steadily. The legislative body has passed and promulgated the Law on the Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures, the Law on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture, the Law on 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, the Income Tax Law Concerning Foreign Invested 
Enterprises, etc. 
In the past fifteen years a large amount of financial resources has been directed into the 
construction of infrastructures in the areas that are particularly attractive, including power supply. 
telecommunication, highway, railroad, airport, wharf, etc. The improvement in the infrastructure 
condition has provided a better condition for the FDI. 
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The Present Structure of Foreign Direct Investment 
The current structure of FDI in China has exhibited the following characteristics. First. 
foreign funds have been relatively concentrated in the industrial and real estate sectors. Too little 
has been put into infrastructure and basic industries. For example, in 1994, China approved 
47,000 foreign-funded projects, with a total of US$82.68 billion, of which 29% were in real 
estate. Only 1.2% are agriculture projects, and 2.4% in transportation and telecommunication. 
Second, the foreign investment has come from more than 150 countries and regions, but 
70% of FDI funds come from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. These investors brought in many 
small-scale and labor-intensive projects. Table 4.3 illustrates the source country distribution of 
FDI in China. As shown Japan is the second largest source country. In 1991 Japan invested 
US$532.5 million in China, which accounted for 12.2 percent of the total. The United States and 
Germany are the next two major source countries, with 7.4 percent and 3.7 percent shares in 
China's total FDI inflows. According to Wei (1994. P. 191): 
"The primitive and imperfect legal regime in China is one important reason for the 
lopsided distribution of the supply of foreign direct investment. On the one hand, investors from 
the United States and other large source countries of multinational corporations are wary about 
the security and stability of their investment in China. On the other hand, for the overseas 
Chinese (Particularly those residing in Hong Kong), the cultural and linguistic link helps to 
reduce informational and contractual costs. To contribute to the skewed source-country 
distribution . some regions in China offer explicit or implicit preferential policies to overseas 
Chinese with ancestry form those regions." 
Third, the east coastal areas drew in over 80% of the total foreign investment. Table 4.4 
shows the uneven distribution of FDI among China's provinces (Chen. Chang, and Zhang. 1995). 
Guangdong province attracted 51.8 percent of (accumulated) total FDI in China between 1979 
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and 1987. Fujian. the province that ranked the second in actual invested FDI in 1990 has been 
blessed by Taiwanese businessmen, most of whom consider Fujian as their roots in China. 
Beijing and Shanghai are also among the largest FDI host provinces. 
Fourth, the pattern of location of FDI in China. Natural resource oriented FDI are located 
in where the resources are such as in the Occidental coal mine in Shanxi Province and the oil-
related FDI along the South China coast Joint ventures and hotels are mostly built in the major 
cities and tourist destinations. Foreign investors seeking Chinese partners in large enterprises 
generally flock to the industrial centers of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin. Wuhan and the cities of the 
North East and of southern Jiangsu. Since the mid-1980s, such investors have also been attracted 
to Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where more modern infrastructures than the older industrial cities have 
been established, together with unmatched transport links via Hong Kong to the world. Those 
foreign investors that are interested in taking advantage of the cheap labor in China first explored 
the SEZs. As labor costs in Shenzhen rose rapidly, they moved elsewhere in the Pearl River Delta 
and to Fujian. where a similar wage-cost pressure on Taiwanese producers contributed to the 
inflow, and to Shanghai. By the late 1980s, export-oriented FDI in labor-intensive manufacturing 
activities had moved up the coast and was spreading quickly10. 
4.4. Rates of Returns and Foreign Capital Inflows: The Role of Human Capital 
In this section I apply Lucas' methodology (1990) to compute the rates of return to capital 
in the twenty eight provinces in China and examine the role of human capital in attracting foreign 
capital. The following model directly benefits from Ratcliffe (1994). 
Pomfert. 1993, P. 96. 
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Rates of Return 
The Model 
Suppose that the production follows a Cobb-Douglas type constant returns technology 
with a common intercept, 
r=AK*L''* (4.1) 
where A is the technology level. K is the aggregate physical capital, and L is the labor force. 
Technological progress and labor force growth exogenousiy determine the rate of income growth. 
Next we include h, human capital per worker, in the production as the engine of growth 
Y=AK*(hL)\ (4.2) 
Increases in human capital can be interpreted as labor-augmenting technological progress. 
Moreover, human capital may also create effects external to the individuals, which can be 
captured by 
Y=AK*(hL)l~*ha (4.3) 
where A„ denotes average human capital. The higher the average skill level of workers in an 
economy, the higher the productivity of workers at all skill levels. The external effect of human 
capital. hu. can also be interpreted as the level of technology in the economy". If workers arc 
identical, then h = ha. and 
' ' Lucas in his 1990 paper (P. 93) explained, "...the term h1 as an external effect (just as in Paul 
Romer (1986)). It multiplies the productivity of a worker at any skill level h' exactly as does the 
intercept A." 
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y = A X * ( A i ) ' ^ r \ (4.4) 
Firms choose labor and investment to maximize the present discounted value of net cash 
flow, i.e., 
MAX AX*(/iI)l"l5n L"1 -R^-R^ihD-wL (4.5) 
where Rk is the cost of physical capital, flu is the cost of human capital, and w is the wage rate. 
Thus, 
RK=¥- = $AK*~,(hL),>"'L\ (4.6) 
oK 
Substituting out for capital stock due to lack of data, we have 
i '— I 
K r - P ' v / A * ' 2 (4.7) 
where v. = — . 
hL 
Similarly, in the model with internal effects of human capital, the predicted returns to 
capital are 
RK=V~*yk' . (4.8) 
In the standard neoclassical model without human capital, 
R, =P*v ' (4.9) 
where v = —. 
L 
' Income per worker is yk = Ak*hy, and physical capital has been substituted out as 
i i I 
k = A i v i h i . 
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Let /= 1,2 30 denote all the provinces'3 in China and SH denote Shanghai. As one 
of the most industrialized regions in China, Shanghai's level of capital stock and share of capital 
are among the highest in all the provinces in China. Then, the ratio of return rates of capital from 
the neoclassical producuon function is: 






V V*JM ) 
(4.11) 




*JW ) \ "at
 t 
(4.12) 
Note that since we arc comparing the ratios of return rates of regions relative to Shanghai. 
units are canceled out. 
If the ratio of predicted return rates exceeds one, the model predicts that FDI will flow to 
poorer provinces rather than to Shanghai. Treated as relauvely standardized "countries", China's 
provinces had similarly strong barriers to equalization of returns in prohibitions against foreign 
investment. After permitting inflows, what we should be seeing is a slow process of equalizing 
returns 
14 
13 Include Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. 
14
 Empirical studies sometimes failed to provide strong supporting evidence for the ratios of 
return rate argument (Agarwal, 1980) partly owing to the difficulties of measuring expected 
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The Data 
We have obtained the provincial GDP and employed social labor force data from China 
y 
Statistical Yearbook (various years), which give us per worker GDP data (y = —). 
China Statistical Yearbook also provides the numbers of graduates from primary schools, 
secondary schools, and universities for the period of 1985-9415. We then divide these numbers by 
the number of total population in a province to derive the percentage of graduates over total 
population, the human capital variable h, used in the following computation of ratios of rates of 
return. 
Since the capital stock data for China are not available, we first take the values of 
P = 0.36 and 7 = 0.40 (as Lucas did) in the computation and then apply a range of numbers 
derived by other articles'6 to show the sensitivity of the return rates to the changes in P and 7 . 
profits since reported profits are likely to differ from actual profits. One major pitfall of the rate 
of return theory is the assumption of an aggregate production. If there are multiple production 
activities with different capital requirements, aggregate capital-output ratios can differ widely 
between economies that pay the same factor rewards. Examination of countries' aggregate 
capital-output ratios cannot, in itself, be informative about opportunities for efficiency-enhancing 
international investment flows. A more convincing, albeit painstaking, method is to evaluate 
sector rates of return directly. 
15
 The 1986 data are missing. We take the average of 1985 and 1987 as the 1986 input in the 
computation. 
16
 The external benefit of human capital is especially difficult to measure. Estimates for 7 range 
from 0.15 in Bartlesman, et. al. (1991) to 0.36 in Lucas (1988, 1990). Mankiw. Romer and Weil 
(1992) estimate that both P andy equal roughly 0.33. Barro. Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1992) 
take p = 05 and 7 = 03. 
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The Results 
Tables 4.9 - 4.9 present the ratios of rates of return to capital in China's twenty-eight 
provinces for both the standard neoclassical model and the neoclassical model with human 
capital. 
In the standard neoclassical model (Table 4.5, where the level of physical capital per 
worker is the only determinant of the rate of return to physical capital, the implicit rates of return 
in Shanghai are all lower than those in the other provinces'7 whose ratios of capital to labor used 
in the production process are mostly lower. Moreover, as P. the share of capital used in 
production, goes up, the rates of return become smaller. 
When the percentages of graduates from primary and secondary schools over total 
population are incorporated as the human capital variables into the neoclassical model, the 
difference in the return rates between Shanghai and other regions has enlarged, rather than 
reduced (Table 4.6 and Table 4.7). More importantly, contrary to Lucas* argument, both the 
internal and external return rates are higher than those in the neoclassical model. Also, the 
external return rates are all considerably higher than the internal ones. 
The results above confirm that the marginal product of (physical and human) capital is 
higher than the marginal product of physical capital and the importance of the spill-over effect of 
investment in human capital, i.e., the improvement of technology level. 
When the percentage of graduates from universities over total population serves as the 
human capital variable (Table 4.8), however, the return rates are significantly lower than those in 
17
 For simplicity, we include Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin whenever provinces are referred to 
in this paper, although they are cities directly administrated by the central rather than a provincial 
government. 
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the neoclassical model and also much lower than those when percentages of graduates from 
primary and secondary schools over total population are used as the human capital variables in 
the neoclassical model. This conforms to Lucas' evidence. Moreover, the internal rates of return 
in many provinces are lower than those in Shanghai. While the external effects of human capital 
are considered, only the rates of returns in Beijing and Tianjin (1993) are higher than those in 
Shanghai. Moreover, everywhere else except in Beijing, the external rates of return are all 
considerably lower than the internal rates. Beijing has the highest percentage of university 
graduates in China; thus we should observe a significant effect of higher education on the rates of 
return. 
Although the inclusion of the percentage of university graduates into the production 
function has reduced the return rates for most of the provinces relative to Shanghai, however, we 
cannot argue that the lower level of higher education is the main reason why foreign capital does 
not invest in poor regions. The ratios of university graduates over total population in all of the 
regions in China are too small to exert significant effect on foreign capital inflows. In fact, when 
I integrate the human capital variables (Table 4.9), the university effect vanishes. Once again, the 
primary and secondary school effects become dominant: the ratios of return rates are higher than 
those in the neoclassical model. The integrated human capital here is defined as the sum of the 
products of the percentages of primary, secondary and university graduates over total population 
times their relevant numbers of years of education, which are six. twelve, and sixteen years 
respectively in China. 
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The Graphs 
To examine graphically the changes in the return rates, we draw Figures 4.1 - 4.3 for 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Sichuan during 1985-199418. 
More specifically. Figure 4.1 depicts the ratios of return rates for the standard 
neoclassical model. Sichuan, the most populated province in China, consistently has the highest 
return rates'9. Shanghai consistently has the lowest ones, and the other provinces are between 
them. 
Figure 4.2 consists of three graphs (Figure 4.2a. Figure 4.2b, and Figure 4.2c) which take 
into account both the internal and external effects of human capital variables in the neoclassical 
model. Figure 4.2a shows the effect of the percentage of graduates from primary schools over 
total population. The rates of return in Jiangxi province jump well above those in Sichuan 
province while the positions of the other provinces remain the same. Figure 4.2b reveals a similar 
pattern when the percentage of graduates from secondary schools over total population is built 
into the production function. However, when we include the percentage of university graduates 
over total population in the model. Figure 4.2c draws a totally different picture compared with 
Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b. The order of return rates rankings is reversed from Jiangxi, Sichuan, 
Guangdong. Beijing, and Shanghai in Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b to Beijing. Shanghai. Jiangxi. 
These five provinces are selected for the distinct features that they are representing: Beijing 
with the highest endowment in higher education, Sichuan with the largest population. 
Guangdong with the largest foreign capital inflows, and Jiangxi as one of the slow-developing 
regions in China. Moreover, note that the data for 1990 and 1991 are missing. 
19
 It makes sense since Sichuan's share of capital in the production process is probably among the 
lowest in the nation. 
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Sichuan, and Guangdong. Moreover, the rates in Beijing are significantly higher than those in 
other provinces, which demonstrates the importance of the endowments of higher education in 
the return rates. 
Figures 3a - 3d show the return rates both in the neoclassic model and with human capital 
variables for Beijing, Jiangxi. Guangdong, and Sichuan. In three regions, the return rates of 
capital with the percentage of graduates from primary schools incorporated are higher than those 
with the percentages of graduates from secondary schools and universities and in the neoclassic 
model. This result conforms to the argument of Lucas (1990). 
Foreign Capital Inflows and Ratios of Return Rates 
How are the returns rates related to the flows and distribution of foreign direct investment 
in China's provinces? Table 4.10 presents the ordinary least squares regression results for 1992-
1994. The dependent variable is foreign direct investment per capita (CAP,,. where t denotes 
time periods and i denotes regions) and the independent variables are the ratios of return rates 
when the percentages of graduates from primary schools, secondary schools, and universities 
over total population are employed as the human capital variables ( PRIM,,, SECU. and 
UNIV,). 
When CAP,, is regressed on either of PRIMU, SEC,,. or UNIV,,. it is negatively related 
to PRIM,, (-3.54, -18.34. and -35.46 for 1992, 1993 and 1994 respectively) and SEC,, (-6.87. -
25.51. and -42.84) but positively related to UNIV,, * (10.29.45.19. and 64.44). When PRIM,,. 
20
 However, the adjusted R-square seems to be relatively low. 
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SECtJ, and UNIVtJ are all included into the regressions, PRIMU does not appear to be 
significant, SECU remains negatively related to CAP,,, while UNIVU is positively related. For 
example, in 1994, a one percentage point increase in UNlVtJ induces a $48.46 rise in foreign 
capital per capita. 
In conclusion, when adjusted for human capital (PRIMU and SECtJ). the rates of return 
to capital in the neoclassical model become relatively higher than before, which is contrary to 
Lucas' (1990) argument. Only the inclusion of higher education into the model reduces the return 
rates significantly. The OLS regression results reveal a similar negative relation between foreign 
capital flows and primary and secondary education and a positive one with higher education. 
Currently, most FDI in China still depends on the cheap Chinese labor to make profits. Thus we 
can argue that FDI does not necessarily have a normal relation with the educated laborers at this 
stage. Moreover, considering China is still a developing country, the level of higher education 
should not be the major attraction for FDI. However, are there other variables that affect the FDI 
but are missing from the tests? 
4.5. An Empirical Test: The Determinants of Foreign Capital Inflows 
In his 1990 paper. Lucas adjusted for human capital in the production function and 
derived the reduced rates of return difference between a rich and a poor country. But he did not 
empirically test the other explanatory variables that might have affected the directions of foreign 
capital inflows. This section employs an empirical test to parametricly identify the main factors. 
besides human capital, that determine foreign capital inflows into China. 
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The Data 
In section 4.2 we have discussed the determinants of FDI flows to a host country from 
microeconomic, macroeconomic, and macro-political aspects. Now we would like to find out the 
factors that affect FDI to provinces in China. Thus we can control the country-specific decisions 
variables2' such as trade policies, the rate of economic growth, legal investment environments, 
exchange rate, host country instability, and host country FDI policies22 (monetary and fiscal 
policies, capital controls, transfer pricing regulations, antitrust policy, labor relations policies, 
intellectual property rights enforcement, etc.) We simply concentrate on region-specific variables 
such as industrial output, GDP per capita, location, education, wages, investment rates. 
infrastructure development, financial development, natural resources, urbanization, 
markeuzation, industrialization, and number of overseas Chinese23. Unfortunately, at present not 
all of the above data are available. Therefore I employ the GDP. wage, exports, investment rate. 
freight traffic (infrastructure condition), industry output value, and human capital variables data 
in the model to capture at maximum the factors that are important for foreigners to invest in 
China. 
21
 Refer to Section 4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
22
 China's provinces follow the national foreign investment policies unless located in special 
economic zones or other economic and technological development zones specified by the central 
government. Investment in China, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperauon. China, 
1995. 
23
 There might be an information issue between overseas Chinese and foreigners about the actual 
investment environment in China, and thus they might have different opinions of prospects for 
investing in China. 
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ATSCSModel 
We need to analyze data collected over multiple time periods and multiple provinces. 
These data are known as time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, or sometimes as panel data. For 
example. Chart I shows that the return rates in Sichuan province are consistently higher than 
those in Shanghai, which indicates that we need to include some form of cross sectional analysis 
in the fitted model. Moreover, we need to check for time series effects within each cross section. 
FDI is likely to be influenced by a long list of factors, many of which are difficult to 
measure or observe. The following TSCS model of foreign direct investment is constructed on 
the availability of data. 
FDI,, =a+a1GDP„ +a2WAGEIJ +a,£XP„ +OLXDISTU +a,/ND(/S„ +aJNVEST,, 
+a1TRAFll +a ,POPt / , +a^UNIV,J +aX0SECu +axxPRIM,, + «,, 
(4.13) 
where WAGE,, is average wage of staff and workers, DlSTtJ measures the distance between the 
provincial capitals and the major ports (Table 4.11), and TRAF,, represents freight traffic (100 
million ton.km/10.000 person). All the other variables are expressed in terms of provincial shares 
of the national total: FDI,,. GDP,,, EXPU, INDUS,,. INVU, and POPU,, represent the 
provincial shares of foreign direct investment, gross domestic product, export, industry output 
value, fixed investment, and population in the national total. UNIV,,, SEC,,, and PRIM,, are 
the provincial shares of graduates from universities, secondary schools, and primary schools over 
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the national total. Data denoted in US dollars are deflated by the US CPI (1990 = 100), and those 
denoted in Chinese RMB are deflated by the Chinese Retail Price Index (1990= 100). All the 
variables are stated in logarithms. 
In a panel data set, uu 's are usually not homoskedastic. Instead, the variance of u,a might 
well vary systematically with t or i or both of them. Moreover, it seems plausible that the error 
terms utJ and u/t will be correlated for some i *• j if certain shocks affect several cross-
sectional units at the same point in time. Similarly, it seems plausible that the error terms u,, and 
u,, will be correlated for some / # s if certain shocks affect the same cross-section unit 
(province) at more than one point in time. When any of these failures of the identical 
independence distribution (i.i.d.) assumption will occur, and we simply use linear least squares, 
we will obtain an estimated covanancc matrix that is inconsistent and may lead to serious errors 
of inference. In some circumstances, we may even obtain inconsistent parameter estimates 
To overcome the problems above, we employ an error-components model The idea is to 
model utJ as consisting of three individual shocks, each assumed to be independent of the others 
utJ s e . + v . + e , , (4 14) 
Here e, affects all observations for time period t, v, affects all observations for cross-section 
unit (province) i. and £,, affects only observation it In the most common versions of error-
components models, the e, s are assumed to be independent across t. the u, \ arc assumed to 
be independent across i, and efJ 's are assumed to be independent across all / and t 
There are two ways to estimate a regression model with error terms that are assumed to 
consist of several error components: a fixed-effects model and a random-effects model. The«e 
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two approaches are conceptually quite different. We estimate a fixed-effects model conditionally 
on the errors e, and u, and treat the effects of omitted individual - specific variables as fixed 
constants over time. A random-effects model treats the effects of omitted individual - specific 
variables as random variables and estimates e, and u, unconditionally. A fixed-effects model 
can be estimated by least-squares dummy variable (LSDV)24. while a random-effects model 
requires GLS (Generalized Least Square) or ML (Maximum Likelihood). 
Hausman (1978) developed a test to identify the correlation between the error and the 
repressors. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the error and the repressors, the 
random effects model is applicable and its EGLS (Efficient Generalized Least Squares) estimator 
is consistent and efficient. Under the alternative it is inconsistent, the OLS estimator of the fixed-
effects model is consistent under both the null and the alternative. Consequently, the difference 
between the variance-covariance matrices of the OLS and EGLS estimators is the variance-
covariance matrix of the difference between the two estimators, allowing calculation of a chi-
square test statistic to test this difference against zero. In general, large values of the Hausman 
statistic argue in favor of the fixed effects models over the random effects model. However, if we 
have time invariant repressors, such as sex or region, we cannot compute the fixed effects 
estimator. The fixed effects estimator requires that there will be within group variation in all 
variables for at least some groups25. 
" The LSDV estimator is also called the Within-Group estimator because only the variation 
within each group is utilized in forming this estimator. Hsian (1986) 
25
 Greene (1995). 
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The data I employ here are from all the provinces in China (except Tibet) . They are not 
randomly drawn but chosen deliberately because those provinces in the aggregate represent the 
whole China. 1 herefore the fixed effects model should be more appropriate for the purpose of the 
analysis. To capture the variations both within groups and across time, the two-factor TSCS 
model is chosen in the empirical test27. 
The Results 
According to the Hausman tests (Table 4.12), the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the error and the repressors is accepted in Models 1, 2. and 5. For the rest of the models 
the fixed effect prevails. 
Wc first analyze the effect of human capital on the foreign direct investment inflows in 
Model 1. PRIM negatively related to FDI, SEC is not significant. UNIV appears as the only 
significant variable and positively related to FDI. One percent of increase in the share of 
university graduates over the national total might attract 0.39 percent increase in FDI. 
Second, let's observe the effects of other variables on FDI. In Model 2 GDP does not 
seem to have a positive effect on FDI. The effects of human capital variables (PRIM. SEC. and 
UNIV) are similar to those in Model 1. The negative sign between GDP and FDI is puzzling 
since during the period of 1987-1994 both GDP and FDI had been inc. casing. Regretfully we 
cannot offer a satisfactory answer at this moment. 
26
 Due to lack of data. 
27
 Refer to William H. Greene's Limdep: User's Manual and Reference Guide, Version 6.0. Page 
313 for a complete explanation of the two-factor TSCS model. 
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INDUS, the share of the private sector in total industry output value, shows a positive 
relation with PD/in all the models ranging from 0.26 to 0.46. The result strongly indicates that 
the speed of industrialization and the growth of the private sector serves as one of the engines 
that drive FDI into China. 
WAGE affects FDI inflows negatively, which conforms to the cheap labor cost argument. 
When WAGE goes up by one percent, FDI tends to decrease by 0.49-0.85 percent. 
TRAF, the freight traffic indicator, has a significant negative relation with FDI in the 
random-effect model but insignificant positive effect in the fixed-effect model. This is puzzling 
since we expect that foreign capital is usually drawn to the regions that are better equipped in 
freight traffic. However, whether TRAF is positively or negatively related to CAP depends on the 
locations and type of FDI. For example. TRAF in Shanghai might not be as good as, say, Hebei 
province, but foreigners still invest in Shanghai for other reasons. 
Population has a negative relation in the fixed-effect model. One explanation might be 
that since per capita GDP might be highly related to wages. The inclusion of both GDP and 
population in the model might to some extent discount the wage effect. 
EXP the total exports indicator has a positive relation with FDI in the random-effects 
model. There are four reasons that might explain such a positive relationship between exports 
and FDI: First, the dynamic effect, the more you invest, the more you export, and the more you 
invest back. Second, the information effect, that is, people go where others are. The fact that one 
person is investing in a host country might create an image of a positive future investment 
environment for the host country, which will attract more investors. Third, the government 
favored foreign investors who planned to export. Fourth, the level of total exports in a country 
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can be used as an indicator to measure the degree of openess. The higher the degree of openess, 
the faster the growth of exports, and so the growth of foreign direct investment. 
INVEST is the provincial's share of fixed assets investment over the nations! total. It has 
positive coefficients in the random-effect model. This result identifies the importance of the 
growth of the economy and industrialization. 
The distance variable DIST did not yield any significant coefficient due to multi-
collinearity. This is probably because it is fixed across time. 
Overall, the human capital variables do not seem to have a systematic effect on FDI. 
while INDUS, EXP. INVEST, and WAGE have more significant relations with FDI. Lack of time 
series data and other missing variables (such as location, financial development, and natural 
resources) might have weakened the result. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Endogenous growth models have built human capital as an endogenous variable into the 
neoclassical production function. In the case of China, the inclusion of the percentages of 
graduates from primary and secondary schools into the production process yield higher rates of 
return for "poor" regions relative to the "rich" one - Shanghai, contrary to Lucas' argument 
(1990) that human capital equalizes the rate of return between poor and rich countries. Although 
the percentage of university graduates over total population reduces the rates of return in the poor 
regions, this should NOT serve as proof of Lucas' conjecture. When the three human capital 
variables are integrated, the university effect cancels out but the primary and secondary effects 
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become dominant. Therefore we can conclude that the experience of China does not provide 
strong support for Lucas' argument in his 1990 paper28. 
The results of the empirical test confirm that foreign direct investments in China are 
positively related to the size of the market, the growth of the private sector, and the level of 
industrialization. 
28
 Moreover, in China only two or three percent of total population have college education, it is 




This dissertation has studied the Chinese economic reform in the areas of the central-local 
government fiscal relation, trade liberalization, and foreign investment policies and found the 
following results. 
The essay on Export Promotion, Trade Planning, and Real Exchange Rate argues that 
China has made significant progress in moving to a more market-based export sector. The 
reduction of planned exports and export subsidies, the establishment of a foreign exchange 
retention system, and foreign exchange adjustment centers have all contributed to a greater 
responsiveness of exports to the changes in the real exchange rate in China. In contrast with 
previous studies, the essay finds some evidence of a structural break in the liberalization of 
exports after 1984, six years after China embarked on its historic economic reform. The overall 
results do not provide strong evidence of a negative price elasticity of exports with respect to the 
real exchange rate as argued by Brender (1992). an International Monetary Fund scholar. 
Although China and Eastern Europe have initiated different political revolutions, they seem to 
have shared some common economic problems. For example, the pricing of traded goods in 
socialist states poses an obstacle to increased openness that is at least an order of magnitude 
greater than that faced by most developing economies. The Chinese experience demonstrates the 
importance of sustained decentralization of control of foreign trade and the maintenance of a 
competitive real exchange rate. 
In the second essay on Incentive, Corruption, and Tax Administration I employed a 
Principal-Agent Model to discuss the impact of corruption in tax administration at the local level 
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on the tax revenue of the central government in a decentralized fiscal system. I found out that 
when the central government does not have the information about the true income of firms and 
when local governments have great discretion in manipulating the tax administration system, the 
tax revenue of the central government is subject to erosion due to collusion between firms and 
local governments. The asymmetric information between the central and local governments about 
enterprises' assets allows local governments to collude with enterprises by lowering their 
effective tax rates in order to keep resources within the territory of local governments. 
Federalism will also result in a decline of the total amount of tax revenue of the country. To solve 
the problem, the central government needs to control the tax administration system or design an 
incentive-compatible tax revenue sharing scheme for local governments. 
The last essay of the dissertation on The Determinants of Foreign Capital Inflows to 
Regions in China: An Evaluation of Lucas' Contention provides empirical evidence showing that 
including human capital in the neoclassical growth model does not resolve the question "Why 
doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?" posed by Lucas (1990). Twenty eight 
provinces in China are tested with the result that predicted rates of return to physical capital in 
some poor provinces are more than 600 percent of those in Shanghai, the representative rich 
province. The paper finds that the size of the market and the growth of private economy are the 
main factors that determine the foreign capital investment in China. 
In conclusion, the Chinese experiences in reforming the central-local government fiscal 
relation, liberalizing the foreign trade regime, and attracting foreign capital indicate that China's 
economic reform has successfully solved the revenue sharing problem between the central and 
local governments by taking control of the tax collection process; it has significantly reduced the 
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share of command exports so that China's exports have grown more responsively to the changes 
in the world market prices; and it has attracted large inflows of foreign direct investment by 
speeding up the economic reform, especially expanding breeding the private sector. Transition 
economies facing similar problems could learn from the Chinese approaches in solving them. 
Foreign investors are free to make their own choices concerning the future of investing in China. 
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The null model is y, = a , +y,_, +e, (E, white noise). 
Yearly Data 
MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of unit root are: -3.7667 (1%), -
3.0038 (5%), 
and-2.6417 (10%). 
* rejection of null hypothesis at 1 % significance level. 
** rejection of null hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
*** rejection of null hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
Quarterly Data 
MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of unit root are: -3.5572 (1%), -
2.9167(5%). 
and-2.5958 (10%). 
* rejection of null hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
* rejection of null hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
*** rejection of null hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
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Table 1A Regression Result: Yearly Data 
Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX. UKX. JX.OX.HX) 
Independent variable: Real Exchange Rates - RER (TWRERY. UXR. UKR. JR. GR. HR) 
Coefficients 

































Note: T-ratxs are in parentheses. 
Model 2 
Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX. UKX. JX. GX. HX) 
Independent variable: Foreign Income- FGDP (FGDPY. UXP. UKP. JP. GP. HP) 
Coefficients 


































Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX UKX. JX. GX HX) 
Independent variables: RER and FGDP 
Coefficients 















































Table 14 (continued) 
Mo»W 4 
Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX. UKX. JX. GX. HX) 
Independent variables: RER. Dummy Variable (079.084.087). Structural Variable (RER*Dummy Variable) 


































































































































































































































Table 1A (continued) 
Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX. UKX. JX GX HX) 
independent variables: FGDP. Dummy Variable (D79. D84. D87). Stractural Variable (FGDP'Dummy Variable) 






































































































































0 2484 19310 
0.7332 19684 












































































Table 1A (continued) 
MfliuJi 
Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX UKX JX. GX HX) 
Independent variables: RER. FGDP. Dummy Variable (D79. D84.087). Structural Variable (RER*Dummy Variable. FGDP*Dutnmy Vanat 
A. D79 as the Dummy Variable 

































































































B. DS4 as the Dummy Variable 




































































































































































































Table 15 Regression Result: Quarterly Data 
Ma*Lt 
Dependent variable Exports (EXPORTSQ. USXQ. UKXQ. JXQ. GXQ. HXQ) 
IndependeM variable tfealExcbaru^Raie^ RER CTWU^ 
Cotffidtnts 

























































































Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSQ. USXQ. UKXQ. JXQ. GXQ. HXQ) 


































































Dependent variable: Exports (EXPORTSY. USX UKX fX. GX HX) 
Independent variables. RER and FGDP 
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Table 4 J Source Country Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1990-94 











































































































































Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
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Table 4.4 Geographical Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment in China 







Southern Coastal provinces: 
Guangdong 
Fujian 
































































* Cumulated pledged amount. 
** Actual invested. 
Source: Chen. Chang, and Zhan (1995) 
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Table 4.11 Distance from Provincial or Municipal Capitals to their Nearest Port 
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Figure 2.4a Stability Test 









.« . . .m — . t t t i 
i — . i » t | 
!0«9*>»l<«vj(O». »X) 
l = S 
. 3 " ; * " , . - - - . M I U t t j 
162 
Figure 2.4b Stability Test 
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